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Abstract
This paper extends stochastic research in new open-economy macro-
economics (NOEM) to study the eﬀects of the exchange-rate regime on
international trade in a more realistic, yet rigorous, analytical set-up. We
essentially incorporate ”iceberg” costs, inducing home bias, into a unified
framework which nests trade between countries that produce similar vs.
diﬀerent composite goods. Our main result is that given (some degree
of) producer’s currency pricing with symmetry in structure and money
shock distributions as the only source of uncertainty, a fixed exchange
rate slightly reduces expected trade, measured as a share in GDP, relative
to a float under elastic import demand, i.e. when countries’ output mixes
are similar; inelastic import demand, possible under the same taste for
diversity but far less substitutable national outputs arising in our model
from diﬀerences in endowments although not in technological labor input
requirements, reverses this conclusion. What a peg can achieve in any
of these cases is trade stabilization (across states of nature). It would
be greater for (symmetric) nations which (i) have a larger proportion of
producer’s currency pricing in their trade, (ii) are exposed to higher mone-
tary uncertainty, (iii) produce less substitutable output mixes and (iv) are
located closer to one another or apply weaker bilateral trade restrictions.
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1 Introduction
The voluminous literature that has directly or indirectly asked the question
whether peg vs. float matters for trade and/or welfare has not arrived yet
at a satisfactory answer. A fixed exchange rate has often been claimed to
substantially increase trade, mostly on empirical grounds as, for instance, in
Rose (1999). Bacchetta-vanWincoop (2000) and Mihailov (2003) have, however,
concluded in related theoretical work that this should not necessarily be the
case. The objective of the present paper is thus to examine further the eﬀects
of the exchange-rate regime on trade prices and flows in a careful manner, by
also looking into some of their key non-monetary determinants. Building on
the stochastic new open-economy macroeconomics (NOEM) set-up in Mihailov
(2003) which parallels a consumer’s currency pricing (CCP) model version to a
producer’s currency pricing (PCP) one, we first incorporate broadly interpreted
”transport” costs into a baseline NOEM model. We then study the role such a
market friction plays in an extended and unified framework that allows to nest
alternative types of trade in the simplest analytical way.
The relevant literature, classic as well as NOEM, has usually modelled in
separation either trade of diﬀerentiated brands belonging to the same homoge-
neous product1 or trade arising from complete specialization in the production
of just one national good-type.2 A major import of the present paper is that it
embeds trade in similar vs. diﬀerent output mixes within a common theoreti-
cal framework, at the same time taking an explicit account of impediments to
cross-border transactions. Our unified approach becomes feasible, it is true, at
the cost of a highly stylized environment, by essentially attributing the primary
cause of the international exchange of goods to identical tastes for diversity and
not to Ricardian comparative advantage in productivity. Nevertheless, a micro-
founded general-equilibrium analysis of the eﬀects of the exchange-rate regime
on both types of trade in the presence of barriers, in addition to the monetary
uncertainty and the CCP vs. PCP nominal rigidity of our initial set-up, appears
justified as an insightful first shortcut.
Our results basically show that, although robust to some of the general-
izations introduced, the frictionless, single substitutability NOEM set-up, in
particular Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998, 2000 a, b) and Mihailov (2003),
is rendered better suited to explain the role the exchange-rate regime plays
in influencing international trade when extended in the ways we propose here.
Once trade costs and distinct cross-country substitutability are integrated into
1As in Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ (1995, 1998, 2000, 2001) models, to quote just the earliest NOEM
examples.
2As in Corsetti-Pesenti (1997, 2001 a, 2001 b, 2002) extensions (under unit substitutability
across national good-types) of the original Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ framework.
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it, equilibrium outcomes tend to duly emphasize — beyond money shocks and
invoicing conventions — the preponderance in trade determination of these two
deeper ”fundamentals”. In a preview of our principal findings, we could say
that, first, PPP does not hold anymore under PCP, with even symmetric ice-
berg losses of the output shipped abroad. Second, national trade shares in GDP
under production of similar goods drastically fall in the presence of cross-border
barriers to their exchange. The reason is that such obstacles induce a home
bias in consumption in the optimal behavior of agents with identical tastes, a
relatively novel feature within NOEM. This bias is, furthermore, considerably
mitigated to more empirically relevant levels under production of diﬀerent out-
put mixes under moderately elastic import demand. But the most important
result the paper derives is that, unlike in Mihailov (2003), the exchange-rate
regime aﬀects under PCP expected trade-to-output ratios, in a way depending
on the interaction of trade costs with the degree of substitutability between the
nationally-produced composites: under elastic demand of similar products a
peg slightly reduces expected trade relative to a float given the same symmetric
distribution of money shocks, in both economies and, hence, for the world as a
whole; under inelastic demand because of complete specialization in two diﬀer-
ent equally-valued good-types, a peg slightly reduces expected trade relative to
a float. But this eﬀect of the exchange-rate regime on costly trade under mone-
tary uncertainty is not quantitatively significant, as also found in related NOEM
literature. Another new point from our analysis is that non-monetary factors
such as transport or tariﬀ frictions and the substitutability of output mixes also
determine, via the consumption bias, the variability of trade-to-output. As to
the trade stabilization a peg can achieve under (some) PCP, a contribution of
the present study is to clarify that its extent would be greater for countries
or currency blocs which produce less substitutable good-types for meaningful
costs of exchanging them and are located closer to one another or apply weaker
restrictions in their bilateral trade.
The paper is further down organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our ex-
tended stochastic NOEM model of exchange rate and trade determination and
highlights the diﬀerences in its initial assumptions under CCP vs. PCP. The
third section studies under symmetry how trade costs and distinct type and
brand consumption substitutabilities aﬀect international relative prices and,
consequently, agents’ optimization and the key equilibrium relationships across
our alternative invoicing. Section 4 then focuses on the eﬀects of the exchange-
rate regime on both the expected level and the variability of trade-to-output
ratios, whereas the fifth section clarifies the role played by their real determi-
nants. Section 6 concludes and appendices A and B contain, respectively, a
detailed derivation of optimization and equilibrium results and the proofs of
propositions.
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2 The Extended Model
In this section, we first briefly outline the set-up in Mihailov (2003). We then
explain how our two extensions here, the iceberg costs friction and the distinct
cross-country substitutability, have been analytically integrated within it.
2.1 Our Baseline
General Environment Our stochastic economy exists in a single period3
and is made up of two countries, H(ome) and F(oreign), assumed of equal
size. A continuum of diﬀerentiated brands, each produced and sold by a single
monopolistically competitive firm, is available for consumption. Brands as well
as their producers are indexed by i in H and i∗ in F . In the version of the model
we focus further down, all brands belong to two national good-types produced
under complete specialization due to endowment diﬀerences. This more general
version reduces to the case of a world economy producing varieties of a single
good when substitutabilities across brands and types are not distinguished, as
in Mihailov (2003). Firms in Home are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and
those in Foreign on (1, 2]. We assume sticky prices motivated by menu costs.
Monopolistic competition enables each firm to optimally choose the price(s) at
which it sells its product. Prices are set in advance, i.e. in our ex-ante state
0 (before uncertainty has been resolved), and remain valid for just one period,
i.e. for the ex-post state s ∈ S we consider (after money shocks have been
observed).
Governments and Shocks In each country, there is a government whose
only role is to proportionally transfer cash denominated in national currency to
all domestic households in a random way.4 We interpret such a money supply
behavior as a flexible exchange-rate system and model it in terms of stochastic
money-stock growth rates. Moreover, we restrict it to be jointly symmetric, in
the following sense. For ∀s ∈ S, µs and µ∗s are, respectively, H-money stock
and F -money stock net rates of growth, having the same means and variances.
For the sake of symmetry, ex-ante (state 0) national money holdings of the
representative households in Home and Foreign are assumed identical in terms
of units of each country’s currency:5 M0 = M∗0 . The ex-post (state s) cash
balances, i.e. the domestic-currency budgets with which Home and Foreign
households dispose for transactions purposes in the realized state of nature
s ∈ S, are then respectively given by Ms ≡ M0 + µsM0 = (1 + µs)M0 and
M∗s ≡M∗0 + µ∗sM∗0 = (1 + µ∗s)M∗0 .
3Extension to sequential dynamics is straightforward: it will only violate ex-ante symmetry
right after the first period and thus require recursive simulation. However, since the relevant
measure of variables under uncertainty is their expected level, with which we are concerned
here, simulating and summing over a suﬃciently large number of periods will essentially
replicate the analytically derived and simulated results over multiple states of nature we
report further down.
4Seigniorage is then repaid in a lump-sum fashion, as is standard in the related literature.
5At an initial equilibrium exchange rate S0 = 1, as will be discussed later.
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The only diﬀerence between float vs. peg in terms of the (conditional) joint
distribution (up to second moments, inclusive) of national money growth shocks
(µs, µ
∗
s) and, hence, of the resulting ex-post money stocks (Ms,M
∗
s ) thus arises
from their covariance terms. It is imposed by the definition itself of a fixed vs.
flexible exchange-rate regime: under (pure) float, the (conditional) correlation
of national money stocks is 0; under (credible) peg, this (conditional) correlation
is 1. In essence, our fixed exchange-rate version is thus isomorphic to a model
where a monetary union or a single currency area is hit by just one, common
money shock.
Households In H and F , there is a continuum of households assumed iden-
tical. The population in each of these economies is supposed constant and is
normalized to 1. The representative household (in H as well as in F ) likes
diversity and consumes all brands on the interval [0, 2]. It also supplies labor,
earning the equilibrium wage, and owns an equal proportion of domestic firms,
receiving their profits (in the form of dividends).
The representative household in Home6 maximizes its ex-post (state s) util-
ity:
Max
cs,ls
u(cs, ls), ∀s ∈ S. (1)
Our utility function is assumed to be well-behaved (i.e. to exist, be continu-
ous, twice diﬀerentiable and concave) and separable. ls is (hours of) leisure and
cs is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) real consumption index defined
in the present paper by the following Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator:7
cs ≡



µ
1
2
¶ 1
ν




1Z
0
c
ϕ−1
ϕ
i,s di


ϕ
ϕ−1


ν−1
ν
+
µ
1
2
¶ 1
ν




2Z
1
c
ϕ−1
ϕ
i∗,s di
∗


ϕ
ϕ−1


ν−1
ν



ν
ν−1
.
(2)
In this representative agent economy, the aggregate constraints on (per-)
household behavior coincide with those of the identical households. They are
standard in NOEM but, for completeness, we briefly present them below.
Time Endowment Constraint The endowment of hours to the repre-
sentative household (in Home) is normalized to 1 in each state,
6The notation in which the model is further on set out generally refers to Home, but for
Foreign symmetric relationships hold unless otherwise stated and can usually be verified in
the relevant appendices (on this particular point, see Appendix A.1).
7The analogous definition for the Foreign representative consumer can be verified in Ap-
pendix A.1. Note as well that at this point we introduce a first diﬀerence of the extended
model considered further down with respect to the baseline we are summarizing (here, in
subsection 2.1). This diﬀerence is that ν 6= ϕ, whereas the corresponding simpler aggregator
in Mihailov (2003) assumed ν ≡ ϕ. More on that in subsection 2.3.
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ls + ns ≡ 1, ∀s ∈ S. (3)
so that ns ≡ 1− ls is (Home) household’s (hours of) labor (supply).
Cash-in-Advance (CiA) Constraint Households need to carry cash be-
fore going to the goods market. Moreover, we restrict them to hold and receive
from their monetary authority only domestic currency. Thus (for Home)
csPs|{z}
H national expenditure (in H currency)
≤ Ms|{z}, ∀s ∈ S.
available cash in H (in H currency)
(4)
National Money Market Equilibrium Since CiA constraints are bind-
ing8 and there is no investment and government spending in the model, the
nominal value of national output sold (for consumption) is equal to the total
stock of money in each of the countries:
Ys =Ms, ∀s ∈ S. (5)
Aggregate Budget Constraint = National Income Identity With a
nominal wage rate ofWs and total hours of work amounting to 1−ls, the nominal
labor income of the (Home) representative household is given by Ws(1 − ls).
Nominal dividends from firm profits earned by this household are denoted by Πs.
In equilibrium, all income from the activity of firms is distributed to domestic
households (this happens at the end of the one-period framework we consider):
Ws(1− ls)| {z }
labor income
+ Πs|{z}
ownership income| {z }
H national (factor) income (in H currency)
≡ Ys|{z}, ∀s ∈ S.
H national output (in H currency)
(6)
First-Order Conditions The following ”compact” FONC can be derived
in a familiar way from the above-described constrained optimization problem
for the H representative household:
Ws =
ul,s
uc,s
Ps, ∀s ∈ S. (7)
ul,s and uc,s in (7) are the marginal utilities of leisure and consumption,
respectively, in the realized state s. The real wage rate is thus equal, in equi-
librium, to the ratio of these marginal utilities.
8See Mihailov (2003).
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Firms Production is eﬀected by firms which are owned by domestic households
only. We also abstract from an international stock market, as well as of risk-
sharing issues in general. To simplify this initial analysis of trade in similar vs.
diﬀerent output mixes within a unified framework, we focus here on identical
technologies in terms of labor input for producing a unit of output — although
endowments may diﬀer — common to all firms in Home (and symmetrically in
Foreign):
ys = ns = 1− ls. (8)
A few clarifying comments are now due with respect to the analytical inte-
gration of the trade friction and cross-country substitutability parameters into
the baseline in Mihailov (2003) we summarized in this subsection.
2.2 Incorporating Iceberg Costs
Although heavily exploited in many NOEM models, the key pricing-to-market
(PTM) assumption — which changes crucially their equilibrium outcomes — has
not yet received an explicit and solid grounding within this line of literature. To
rationalize market segmentation and the ensuing possibility for PTM behavior
by monopolistically competitive firms, we introduce symmetric costs of inter-
national trade in goods, τ (≡ τ∗), in the set-up under CCP vs. PCP analyzed
in Mihailov (2003). Following Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s (2001) NOEM application
of ideas in the traditional literature,9 we model them as being of the ”iceberg”
type, i.e. real losses in transit expressed in per cent of the quantity shipped:
0 ≤ τ < 1. Although we model our τ parameter in a quite literal, ”melting
iceberg” fashion, we would nevertheless wish to interpret it in a much more
general context, essentially capturing all kinds of frictions or impediments to
international trade (or transaction costs, in a still broader sense). These may
normally range from obstacles of a subjective (policy) nature such as tariﬀ and
non-tariﬀ barriers to considerations of an objective (physical) character such as
transport costs that are themselves a function of distance and transportation
technology. Productivity shocks are abstracted away in our present framework10
so the quantities of goods exchanged in equilibrium and, hence, national trade-
to-output ratios, are determined by relative monetary shocks.
In both our CCP and PCP versions, the iceberg cost parameter τ ∈ [0, 1)
enters the model via firms’ production cost structure. Under this assumption
a fixed fraction τ of each good shipped abroad ”melts” in transit. Therefore
9Exogenous real ”iceberg” costs of international trade originate in the modelling approach
common to the Ricardian comparative advantage trade and payments theory: to mention just
the most prominent classic studies, in Samuelson (1952) and Samuelson (1954). Transport
costs of that type are assumed too in the seminal paper by Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson
(1977) and its NOEM interpretations in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996: Chapter 4, Section 5, pp.
235-257) and Kraay and Ventura (2002). Trading frictions, not necessarily modelled as iceberg
costs, have also recently been employed outside NOEM, by Martin and Rey (2000), Sercu and
Uppal (2000), Parsley and Wei (2000) and Betts and T. Kehoe (2001), among others.
10Within the (New-)Keynesian modelling perspective of which we make use here this is not
so unusual since output is anyway demand-determined.
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firms have to also produce the additional output that is eventually lost when
crossing the ”ocean”, given that there is demand corresponding to the remaining
part of the output produced for export. A wedge of τ is consequently driven
between output produced and output consumed in real terms once iceberg costs
are considered in a NOEM set-up of the kind.
With view to this, for a real (Foreign) import demand of c∗i,s, a Home firm
i ∈ [0, 1] must ensure (and hence, produce) a real (Home) export supply of
c∗i,s
1−τ .
11 A simple calculation shows why: a real quantity of
c∗i,s
1−τ is produced and
shipped abroad from which only c∗i,s arrives and is consumed by the importing
consumer. The diﬀerence:
c∗i,s
1− τ − c
∗
i,s = τ
c∗i,s
1− τ (9)
”melts” in transit, so real losses due to such a trade friction are a constant
fraction τ of the amount shipped by the exporting producer.
2.3 Distinguishing Brand from Type Substitutability
In Bacchetta-van Wincoop’s (1998, 2000 a, b, 2001) context of frictionless trade
the extent to which agents would substitute away from imports and into home
product analogues once trade costs are accounted for would depend on a unique
consumption substitutability parameter. Had we retained their assumption, as
in Mihailov (2003), that the same type of product is being produced (although in
diﬀerent brands) in the two countries modelled, implying a very high elasticity of
cross-country output demand, equilibrium trade would be (close to) zero because
of the optimally arising home bias in goods consumption, as we formally show
further down. To allow for a richer setting where households may not be as
willing to substitute away from imports, in the present paper we also add to
ϕ (≡ ϕ∗), the elasticity of substitution between any two diﬀerentiated brands, a
distinct composite-good type substitutability parameter ν, 0 ≤ ν ≤ ϕ > 1. In
separating product type from brand consumption substitutability our approach
here is similar to that in recent NOEM contributions such as Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ
(1998), Galí-Monacelli (2002) and notably Tille (1998, a, b, 2001, 2002).
This substitutability decomposition proves to be a useful analytical device.
It allows us to distinguish trade between countries producing the same, but
diversified across brands, output type (ν = ϕ > 1), as in Mihailov (2003),
from trade between countries specializing in only one of two diﬀerent output
types, each diversified across national brands (ν < ϕ > 1). In a more general
sense or as a metaphor, we could refer to these alternative extremes as complete
diversification of (world) production and complete specialization of (national)
production. We do not otherwise deviate from the symmetry considered in
Mihailov (2003).
Our model thus conveniently nests two conceptually diﬀerent types of inter-
national trade, namely the exchange of similar vs. diﬀerent ”output mixes”.
11The logic for a Foreign firm i∗ ∈ (1, 2] is, certainly, symmetric.
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To our knowledge, they have not been explicitly compared within a coherent
framework in the existing literature, with Tille (2002) providing a very recent
exception. As a consequence, our NOEM set-up readily reduces either to the
above-cited Bacchetta-van Wincoop’s series of articles featuring trade in similar
products (the case of ν ≡ ϕ > 1) or to the more frequent alternative focus
on complete specialization and trade in diﬀerent national good-types, but with
unit substitutability between the latter (when 1 ≡ ν < ϕ) employed in most
NOEM papers following Corsetti-Pesenti (1997, 2001 a, b, 2002). Although
also retaining the restrictive assumption of unit substitutability, Tille’s (2002)
analysis allows for even greater generality than our present study by introducing
two sectors in each of the two countries and by varying sectors’ relative size.
Yet he does not explore how transport costs and non-unitary substitutability in
national output composites influence trade prices and flows, which we do here.
In both our CCP and PCP versions, the substitutability parameters ν and
ϕ, with 0 < ν < ϕ > 1, enter the model via the symmetric preference structure
embodied in (2). Following NOEM modelling tradition, ϕ is assumed to be
larger than 1.12 In general, we further down assume that ν < ϕ > 1. Such
an assumption seems the appropriate one in our stylized model context. The
reason is that ν < ϕ implies that there is less substitutability across the aggre-
gate national outputs of the two countries than between any two diﬀerentiated
brands produced in each of these countries, because of naturally (geographi-
cally) predetermined complete national specialization in production. Consump-
tion substitutability is thus lower across types than across brands in the unified
international trade framework we study.13 Moreover unlike ϕ, ν is not restricted
to the elastic region of its domain only, a feature that is related to some last-
ing debates in the empirical trade and development literature14 and that has
important theoretical implications in our further analysis.
3 Costly Trade under CCP vs. PCP
In this section, we compare across our invoicing-specific model versions and
under float and symmetry the optimization problems agents solve and the re-
sulting equilibrium. In particular, the outcomes for the exchange-rate level,
international relative prices, cross-country consumption and leisure allocations
and, ultimately, some key measures of trade flows are derived and interpreted.
12The reason is that otherwise the marginal revenue of firms will be negative (see, for
instance, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), Chapter 10, footnote 2, p. 661).
13 In the special case of ν = ϕ, our two elasticity parameters coincide so that the set-up
reduces to world production of the same homogeneous good type that takes place in both
countries and is diversified across brands, as in Mihailov (2003).
14More precisely, a number of studies have argued that world demand for many products, in
particular primary commodities, is income- and price-inelastic. This has also been advanced
as a major explanation behind the secular decline in the terms of trade of such goods. Todaro
and Smith (2002), p. 522, for instance, refer to World Bank (1994), Table 2.5, in their popular
textbook to claim that the elasticity of demand for foodstuﬀs to developed countries’ income
changes is 0.6% and of agricultural raw materials such as rubber and vegetable oils 0.5%.
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The essential algebra underlying our main results is systematized in more detail
in appendices A.1 and B.
3.1 Optimization and Equilibrium
Consumption Demands and Price Levels Maximizing (2) subject to the
constraints (3) through (6) derives the optimal demands for H- (equation (10)
below) and F -produced ((11) below) goods and the respective price indices at
the domestic absorption (equation (12)), import demand (13) and consumer
(14) levels for the CCP vs. PCP model versions15 as follows:
cCH,s =
1
2
µ
PCH
PC
¶−ν
Ms
PC
vs. cPH,s =
1
2
µ
PPH
PPs
¶−ν
Ms
PPs
; (10)
cCF,s =
1
2
µ
PCF
PC
¶−ν
Ms
PC
vs. cPF,s =
1
2


≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
; (11)
with
PCH ≡


1Z
0
¡
PCi
¢1−ϕ
di


1
1−ϕ
vs. PPH ≡


1Z
0
¡
PPi
¢1−ϕ
di


1
1−ϕ
; (12)
PCF ≡


2Z
1
¡
PCi∗
¢1−ϕ
di∗


1
1−ϕ
vs.
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ| {z }
≡PPF,s
≡


2Z
1
Ã
SPs P
∗,P
i∗
1− τ
!
| {z }
≡PPi∗,s
1−ϕ
di∗


1
1−ϕ
;
(13)
PC ≡
·
1
2
¡
PCH
¢1−ν
+
1
2
¡
PCF
¢1−ν¸ 11−ν
vs. (14)
PPs ≡


1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ν
+
1
2
Ã
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
!
| {z }
≡PPF,s
1−ν


1
1−ν
.
15 Indicated by a superscript of C or P , respectively. For more deatils on our invoicing-
specific notation see Mihailov (2003).
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Output Prices The expected market value of real profits16 which a H firm
i ∈ [0, 1] maximizes under CCP vs. PCP is defined by:
Max
PCi ,P
∗,C
i
E0


uc,s
PC
Ã
PCi c
C
i,s + S
C
s P
∗,C
i c
∗,C
i,s −WCs cCi,s −
WCs c
∗,C
i,s
1− τ
!
| {z }
≡ΠCi,s


, s ∈ S (15)
vs. Max
PPi
E0


uc,s
PPs
Ã
PPi c
P
i,s + P
P
i c
∗,P
i,s −WPs cPi,s −
WPs c
∗,P
i,s
1− τ
!
| {z }
≡ΠPi,s


, s ∈ S. (16)
Using the first order conditions of the two problems, the CCP vs. PCP
optimal prices preset by the Home firm i, which is also the representative Home
firm, for consumer households in the domestic and foreign markets are thus,
respectively:
PCi = P
C
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1
E0
£
uc,sWCs Ms
¤
E0 [uc,sMs]
vs. (17)
PPi = P
P
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1
E0
·
uc,s
Ps
Ws
Ms
P 1−νs
¸
+ (1− τ)ν−1E0
"
uc,s
Ps
Ws
SsM∗s
(SsP ∗s )
1−ν
#
E0
·
uc,s
Ps
Ms
P 1−νs
¸
+ (1− τ)ν−1E0
"
uc,s
Ps
SsM∗s
(SsP ∗s )
1−ν
# ;
(18)
P ∗,Ci = P
∗,C
H =
1
1− τ
ϕ
ϕ− 1
E0
£
uc,sWCs M
∗
s
¤
E0 [uc,sSCs M∗s ]
vs. (19)
P ∗,PH,s =
PPH
SPs (1− τ)
⇒ P ∗,Ps =


1 +
³
1
1−τ S
P
s
´1−ν
1 +
³
1
1−τ
1
SPs
´1−ν


1−ν
PPs
| {z }
PPP-related equation
. (20)
As in Mihailov (2003), under PCP the exchange-rate pass-through to im-
port prices is unitary, while under CCP it is zero. For the same reason, the
16Note that the relevant weights for the states of nature in the formulas below are related
to the marginal utility of consumtion of the representative Home shareholder, uc,s.
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(Home) CPI is constant under CCP, PC , but state-dependent under PCP, PPs .
With transport cost and distinct cross-country substitutability incorporated in
the present extended model, one should observe the following modifications in
the corresponding formulas. First, equation (11) shows that, irrespective of the
invoicing assumption, import demand now optimally depends on τ as well, via
the prices PCF and P
P
F,s.
17 Note that under both CCP and PCP τ enters the
consumer price (cif) but this latter price is preset under CCP in the currency
of the destination market, while under PCP it is the price excluding trans-
portation costs (fob) which is preset in the national currency of the producer.
Consequently, the corresponding PCP consumer price becomes sensitive to the
exchange rate and is, in such a way, ”flexibilized”. Second, optimal consumer
demands (10) and (11) reveal that it is now ν that matters for cross-country
substitution, although ϕ is still important in the determination of CPIs.18
The cost of international exchange, τ , is thus ultimately passed on to con-
sumers, via the eﬀective consumer price, but in a diﬀerent way under the alter-
native invoicing conventions we study. Under CCP it is passed on to importing
foreign consumer-households via the price charged directly in foreign currency.
The exchange-rate risk is nevertheless borne by domestic producing firms, be-
cause of their preset export-market prices. Under PCP the trade cost is passed
on to importing foreign consumer-households too, but now the mechanism is not
the same. It consists in buying, at the price charged in the seller’s currency,
the equivalent — including the output to be lost in transit — of the quantity of
imports optimally demanded. Then the buyer loses τ% of the shipped quantity,
so that he eﬀectively consumes less in real terms than the amount paid for.19
As evident from (20), the price at which Home representative firm’s product
sells in Foreign under PCP, P ∗,PH,s , depends on the exchange-rate level, S
P
s . But
unlike the frictionless, unique substitutability case analyzed in Mihailov (2003),
PPP does not hold anymore in the present PCP model version. Nevertheless,
there is still an equation reminiscent of PPP, with a much more complicated
function replacing the exchange rate. Note that once trade frictions are ac-
counted for, CPIs can be equalized only under two conditions easily verified in
(20): (i) SPs = 1 (peg) and/or (ii) ν = 1 (unit cross-country substitutability).
Equilibrium The constrained optimization problems agents solve and the
market clearing conditions for the world economy given the invoicing and timing
assumptions of our stochastic NOEM framework lead to an equilibrium concept
consistent with the described environment. Since it is not essentially diﬀerent
from the one in Mihailov (2003), its formal definition is relegated to Appendix
A.2, while the equilibrium solutions for the macrovariables we are interested in
17The CCP export market price for Foreign, PCF , is optimally preannounced at a level
symmetric to expression (19) for the analogous price for Home, P∗,CH , as can also be verified
from (8HF C) in our CCP Summary Table 4F of Appendix A.1.
18Which becomes clear from the price level formulas (12) through (14) above.
19An alternative interpretation could be that importing households pay a higher ”true”
price for the consumed quantity, because they also buy the quantity lost in transit and thus
not consumed.
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are presented and discussed in the following subsections.
3.2 Equilibrium Nominal Exchange Rate
The equilibrium nominal exchange rate (NER)20 solves the international forex
market clearing condition which states that excess supply of each of the two
currencies (expressed in the same monetary unit) is zero in any state of nature
s ∈ S. Given the full symmetry we assumed, i.e. with PCH = P
∗,C
F , P
C
F = P
∗,C
H ,
PC = P ∗,C under CCP vs. PPH = P
∗,P
F , P
P
F,s ≡
SPs P
∗,P
F
1−τ , P
∗,P
H,s ≡
PPH
(1−τ)SPs
,
PPs =

 1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−ν


1
1−ν
P ∗,Ps under PCP
21 it can be derived to be22
SCs =
Ms
M∗s
vs. SPs =


1 + (1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν + (SPs )
1−ν| {z }
≡φ(SPs ;ϕ,ν,τ)


1
ν µ
Ms
M∗s
¶ 1
ν
. (21)
The exchange rate expression (21) under CCP, SCs , is exactly the same as
the one in Mihailov (2003), so under full symmetry neither transport cost nor
distinct substitutability considerations aﬀect CCP NER determination in equi-
librium. The reason is that import prices and, hence, CPIs are preset indepen-
dently from the ex-post NER at the same level in Home and in Foreign. The
PCP exchange rate however, SPs , is now much more complicated (but again
implicit) function.
With a fixed exchange-rate regime (i.e. when Ms ≡ M∗s , ∀s ∈ S) the CCP
NER becomes directly 1 for any possible state of nature, whereas with a peg
under PCP the equilibrium NER expression (21) reduces to23
(1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢ν − (1− τ)1−ν ¡SPs ¢1−ν + SPs − 1 = 0. (22)
SPs = 1 is clearly a solution for any ν. Simulations have confirmed that
equation (22) has always the same unique solution, SPs = 1, once ν is given
some numerical value and the roots are restricted to positive (real) numbers,
as it should be.24 So in the present context with an iceberg friction and two
distinct substitutabilities a peg implies again that — under CCP as well as under
PCP and ex-post as well ex-ante — the exchange rate can be substituted by
1 in all expressions which contain it, a finding we shall exploit further on in
discussing the eﬀects of a fixed exchange-rate regime on trade prices and flows.
20Defined as the Home -currency price of Foreign money.
21With also ν < ϕ = ϕ∗ > 1 and 0 < τ = τ∗ < 1 in both model versions.
22 See Appendix A.3.
23 See again Appendix A.3.
24 Since the exchange rate is defined only for positive values, Ss > 0.
14
Optimal Firm Prices under Full Symmetry Using (7) and its equivalent
for Foreign as well as (21) to substitute for the endogenous variablesWs,W ∗s and
Ss in (17) through (20), the optimal firm prices derived earlier can now be fully
determined under CCP and (via the implicit function giving the equilibrium
NER) PCP. The final model solutions for prices in terms of exogenous variables
and parameters only are thus:
PCi = P
C
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1P
C E0 [ul,sMs]
E0 [uc,sMs]
vs.
PPi = P
P
H =
ϕ
ϕ− 1
E0
·
ul,s
Ms
P 1−νs
¸
+ (1− τ)ν−1E0
"
ul,s
SsM∗s
(SsP ∗s )
1−ν
#
E0
·
uc,s
Ps
Ms
P 1−νs
¸
+ (1− τ)ν−1E0
"
uc,s
Ps
SsM∗s
(SsP ∗s )
1−ν
# ;
P ∗,Ci = P
∗,C
H =
1
1− τ
ϕ
ϕ− 1P
∗,CE0 [ul,sM
∗
s ]
E0 [uc,sMs]
vs.
P ∗,PH,s =
PPH
SPs (1− τ)
⇒ P ∗,Ps =


1 +
³
1
1−τ S
P
s
´1−ν
1 +
³
1
1−τ
1
SPs
´1−ν


1−ν
PPs
| {z }
PPP-related equation
.
It is easily seen that under CCP the prices set by the Home representative
firm domestically, PCH , and abroad, P
∗,C
H , will generally not be the same with
now nonzero iceberg costs 0 < τ < 1 even if E0 [ul,sMs] = E0 [ul,sM∗s ] is true,
as it is under separable utility in consumption and leisure.25 It is also clear
that under PCP and float when just one price, in the domestic currency, is
optimally prefixed in each country, the two preannounced prices in the model
will have the same level, PPH = P
∗,P
F (given symmetry and separability, again).
Yet the respective ex-post PCP prices in the foreign currency, P ∗,PH,s and P
P
F,s,
will in general not be equal to those preset domestically. Observe as well that
in the presence of iceberg costs (0 < τ < 1), a peg will never guarantee that the
relevant (ex-post) prices of home and foreign output agents in both countries
face under CCP as well as under PCP are the same, i.e. that PCH = P
∗,C
H =
PCF = P
∗,C
F and P
P
H = P
∗,P
H = P
P
F = P
∗,P
F . This is a result very diﬀerent from —
in a sense, opposite to — what one would obtain in the frictionless model version
considered in Mihailov (2003).
We are now ready to derive — under full symmetry and separability — ex-
pressions for some traditional characteristics of international trade which we
interpret below.
25This separability condition was formally proved by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000 a):
see their Lemma 1 and related Proposition 1.
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3.3 Equilibrium Relative Prices
Let us begin by comparing across our invoicing conventions the three most
important pairs of international relative prices. This analysis will help us later
in understanding the channel along which optimal consumption — and, hence,
trade — flows are determined in our NOEM set-up.
Relative Price of Foreign to Domestic Goods Under CCP with jointly
symmetric money shocks and separable preferences, the relative price of foreign-
produced goods in terms of domestically-produced ones in both countries is
preannounced at the same level of 11−τ . In such a way, any eﬀects of the ex-
post values of these key international relative prices on consumer behavior are
precluded under CCP:26
pCH ≡
PCF
PCH
=
1
1− τ =
P ∗,CH
P ∗,CF
≡ p∗,CF for ∀s ∈ S. (23)
Under PCP, the resulting relative prices of foreign-produced goods in terms
of domestically-produced ones are generally not reciprocal across countries any-
more, as it was in our frictionless baseline, just because of the nonzero iceberg
costs (τ 6= 0):
pPH,s ≡
≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
PPH
=
SPs
1− τ 6=
1
SPs (1− τ)
=
≡P∗,PH,sz }| {
PPH
SPs (1− τ)
P∗,PF
≡ p∗,PF,s unless SPs = 1.
(24)
Terms of Trade With 0 < τ < 1, the terms of trade (ToT) are still inversely
defined with respect to our symmetric countries under CCP, like it was in the
baseline model without trade frictions, but not anymore under PCP. However,
the inverse relationship in the ToT definitions across price setting in terms of
the exchange rate remains valid in the present extended set-up too, due to the
invoicing-specific import and export price indexes. Our CCP model version thus
implies, even with iceberg costs, a negative relationship between the nominal
exchange rate (NER) and the ToT: a nominal depreciation improves the terms
of trade. By contrast, in our PCP model version the relationship between the
NER and the ToT is positive, so that a nominal depreciation weakens the terms
of trade and induces expenditure switching, similarly to the vast literature in
the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch tradition:
26This is a result analogous to the corresponding one in the frictionless baseline, the only
diﬀerence being that then we logically had 1
1−τ =
1
1−0 = 1.
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(ToT )CH,s ≡
≡P Im ,CHz}|{
PCF
SCs P
∗,C
H| {z }
PEx ,CH
= 1SCs
=


≡P Im ,CFz }| {
P ∗,CH
PCF
SCs|{z}
≡PEx ,CF,s


−1
≡
h
(ToT )∗,CF,s
i−1
6= 1 unless SPs = 1
(25)
vs. (ToT )PH,s ≡
≡P Im ,PH,sz}|{
PPF,s
PPH|{z}
≡PEx ,PH,s
=
SPs P
∗,P
F
1−τ
PPH
=
SPs
1−τ 6= 1SPs (1−τ) =
=
≡P Im ,PF,sz }| {
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
P ∗F|{z}
≡PEx ,PF,s
≡ (ToT )∗,PF,s unless S
P
s = 1. (26)
The result in (26) is new. It implies that once transport costs are considered
in a model assuming PCP, state-dependent NER deviations from the initial
symmetric equilibrium of S0 = 1 are magnified in the terms of trade a country
faces. Due to the invoicing-specific import and export price index definitions
again, the PCP ToT should be more volatile (across states of nature) than
the underlying PCP NER, in equilibrium, once a symmetric trade friction is
considered in a stochastic NOEM context like the one we analyze. By contrast,
with τ = 0 under PCP or even with τ 6= 0 under CCP, the volatility of the ToT
is exactly the same as that of the NER, which is evident from (25) and (26).
Real Exchange Rate With 0 < τ < 1, PPP now fails, as we noted earlier.
Yet both our PCP and CCP model versions derive a real exchange rate (RER)
that is inversely defined across countries, just like it was in the frictionless
baseline:27
(RER)PH,s ≡
SPs P
∗,P
s
PPs
=
(1−τ)SPs +1
(1−τ)+SPs| {z }
≡[φ(SPs ;ϕ,ν,τ)]−1
=
=
Ã
PPs
SPs
P∗,Ps
!−1
≡
h
(RER)∗,PF,s
i−1
6= 1 unless SPs = 1 vs. (27)
27Note that with τ = 0, the expression under PCP in the extended model here becomes
state-invariant and equal to 1, and thus identical to the analogous expression in our frictionless
baseline.
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(RER)CH,s ≡
SCs P
∗,C
PC = S
C
s =
Ã
PC
SCs
P∗,C
!−1
≡
h
(RER)∗,CF,s
i−1
6= 1 unless SPs = 1.
(28)
3.4 Equilibrium Consumption and Leisure across Coun-
tries
Having looked at CCP vs. PCP international relative prices in equilibrium, we
now turn to the corresponding cross-country real allocations. Our main results
are summarized in the propositions we state next, in their logical order. Proofs,
based largely on earlier definitions and derivations, are relegated to Appendix B
while interpretations are suggested further down in the main text.
Proposition 1 (Relative Consumption) Relative real consumption is determined
by the relative money stock; but under PCP and not CCP, trade costs and im-
port demand elasticity influence as well the equilibrium allocation across coun-
tries of the quantities consumed.
An important modification in the conclusions with respect to our initial set-
up in Mihailov (2003) is that it is now a richer parameter set, (τ , ν) compared
to only ϕ earlier, which pins down relative consumption under PCP in any state
of nature s ∈ S. In particular, the relevant elasticity of consumption demand
is the cross-country one, ν with 0 ≤ ν < ϕ > 1, and not the substitutability
across the homogeneous product brands, ϕ > 1, as in our initial study. What is
novel here, as also mentioned earlier, is that ν is defined over a larger domain,
including in addition the region of import demand inelasticity as well as the
case of unit elasticity, , 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1 < ϕ. This finding has insightful consequences
for our analysis to which we shall return in more detail later.
Proposition 2 (Home Bias) With positive and symmetric trade costs and
given that ν 6= 0, the optimal split-up of real consumption between demand
for domestic and foreign goods always results under CCP in a symmetric home
bias in both countries, (1− τ)−ν > 1, invariant across states of nature; under
PCP, by contrast, this optimal split-up is determined by the equilibrium nominal
exchange rate.
Now with iceberg costs, import substitution and expenditure switching are
generally optimal not only under PCP when there is exchange rate pass-through
but also under CCP when there isn’t. Consequently, under costly trade in
similar output mixes and even full symmetry, there will always be a home bias
(reciprocal for the two countries), unless (i) τ = 0 or (ii) ν = 0. This home bias
under elastic import demand is derived to be (1− τ)−ϕ, i.e. a positive function
of τ and ϕ(≡ ν) > 1, the unique consumption substitutability across brands
of the homogeneous good-type modelled. Due to the trading friction, τ 6= 0
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(with ϕ > 1 by definition), and ceteris paribus, foreign-produced goods become
more expensive, hence less demanded, than their nationally-produced (close)
substitutes. These conclusions are also valid under costly trade in diﬀerent
composite outputs (when ν < ϕ > 1) with CCP but not with PCP. In that
latter case, the consumption bias is not necessarily also a home bias for both
countries; yet a home bias in each of the economies is likewise always generated
for the realistic region of moderate trade costs and import demand which is
(even marginally) elastic by small monetary shocks, as appropriate in studying
a sticky-price environment.
Evidence for a home bias in goods consumption has often been found in
applied work, and is thus empirically relevant. The theoretical reasons pro-
posed to explain it have usually been associated with either transaction costs
or structural or informational asymmetries. The NOEM literature has only re-
cently started to integrate such a feature into its mainstream set-up. Warnock
(1999), for example, imposes it via heterogeneous preferences of households. In
our analytical framework here the home bias originates in the optimal behavior
of economic agents when facing a trade friction, as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001)
first did within NOEM (under unit cross-country substitutability). The realis-
tic home bias rationalized by incorporating iceberg costs into an otherwise fully
symmetric two-country economy and nuanced across trade/output compositions
and price-setting conventions is another novel feature within NOEM modelling,
to which we have contributed with this paper.
Proposition 3 (Relative Leisure) Under CCP as well as under PCP, output,
employment and leisure are not generally equal across nations.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is the following. Since output is demand-
determined, up to exhausting the CiA constraint, and technologies are assumed
identical, the two countries do not generally produce the same quantities and
do not employ the same labor in equilibrium. Hence, the hours of leisure the
representative households enjoy in Home and in Foreign are in general not the
same either.
3.5 Equilibrium Trade Flows
In this subsection, we interpret the equilibrium trade flows derived under our
alternative invoicing assumptions with shipment losses in Appendix A.4.
Trade Shares by Country It is shown in the mentioned appendix that the
iceberg-cost augmented trade share curve for Home under CCP vs. PCP is given
by
(ft)CH =
2
(1− τ)1−ν + 1
= const Q 1 for ν R 1 vs. (29)
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(ft)PH,s =
2
(1−τ)1−ν
·³
M∗s
Ms
´ 1
1−2ν
³
PPs
P∗,Ps
´ 1−ν
1−2ν
¸
| {z }
=SPs
ν−1
+1
6= const unless SPs = 1.
(30)
The corresponding curves for Foreign are, of course, symmetric:
(ft)CF,s =
2
(1−τ)1−ν+1 = const Q 1 for ν R 1 vs. (31)
(ft)PF,s =
2
(1−τ)1−ν
·³
M∗s
Ms
´ 1
1−2ν
³
PPs
P∗,Ps
´ 1−ν
1−2ν
¸
| {z }
=SPs
1−ν
+1
6= const unless SPs = 1. (32)
The above equations compare directly the impact of our alternative price-
setting assumptions on the ratio of nominal trade to nominal output. Under
CCP, (29) and (31) show that the equilibrium trade share is a state-invariant
function of the consumption bias, (1− τ)1−ν , and its deeper ”fundamentals”, τ
and ν. Moreover, trade in terms of output is the same for the two countries in
any state of nature that has materialized. However, with positive iceberg costs
it is not 1 anymore, as in the frictionless baseline in Mihailov (2003), unless
cross-country output substitutability is unitary. For elastic import demand,
ν > 1, trade-to-output ratios are increasing in the own NER and smaller than 1
in both economies, due to the equal preference for domestic and foreign brands
under high substitutability and trade. If import demand is instead inelastic,
ν < 1, trade shares are decreasing in the own NER and are both larger than 1,
because of the same equal taste for both goods which are now, under national
specialization of production, practically not substitutable. Under PCP, by con-
trast, trade-to-output ratios by country are not state-invariant unless relative
money-stock equilibrium has occurred, as clear from (30) and (32). Trade-to-
output can be 1 in both economies only with unitary import substitutability,
just like under CCP.
To illustrate the intriguing reversal arising in the inelastic region, 0 < ν < 1,
of the PCP trade share curves we have just highlighted, let us compare figures
1 and 2. In both figures, the curves for Home are defined by equation (30),
and those for Foreign by (32) and are drawn for a baseline computation taking
τ = 0.2, as being close to a realistic average across real-world economic branches.
Both graphs show national trade shares in output (ft)Ps (on the vertical axis)
under PCP, float and full symmetry as a function of the nominal exchange rate
SPs (on the horizontal axis).
28 The key diﬀerence is that in Figure 1 bilateral
28And ultimately of the relative money stock MsM∗s
for a given value of the substitutability
parameter, as in the frictionless baseline we analyzed in Mihailov (2003). Although being
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Figure 1: PCP Equilibrium Trade Share Curves under Moderate Transport
Costs and Elastic Import Demand (τ = 0.2 and ν = 6)
import demand is assumed elastic, by setting ν = 6, while in Figure 2 it is
inelastic, with ν = 0.5.
The Home trade-to-output curve is decreasing in the equilibrium NER for
elastic cross-country demand (Figure 1) but increasing for inelastic cross-country
demand (Figure 2). In addition, it is all over concave under import demand in-
elasticity (Figure 2) whereas if demand is elastic an inverse logistic curve — with
only a small initial region concave — obtains (Figure 1). The Foreign trade share
curve as a function of the same NER definition, SPs , is simply the mirror image
of the Home curve, given the full symmetry in our NOEM set-up. Furthermore,
if expressed as a function of the inverse NER, 1SPs , which is in fact the appro-
priate own NER definition from the viewpoint of Foreign residents, the Foreign
trade-to-output curve would completely coincide with that for Home in both
figures, due to symmetry again.
World Trade Share As in the frictionless case, both curves complement
one another but their (equally weighted) sum does not add up to 1 anymore
in the present extended model. Instead, (equally weighted) trade-to-output
ratios sum to less than 1 under diversified production, even under peg when
SPs =
1
SPs
= 1 for any s ∈ S (see Figure 1). The reason is that with high
cross-country substitutability a lot of imported quantities are substituted away
into domestic analogues once (even symmetric) transport costs are taken into
again a function of exogenous money growth rates, the equilibrium NER is now defined by
a more complicated implicit function, (21), and cannot be directly substituted away into the
PCP trade share formulas above.
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Figure 2: PCP Equilibrium Trade Share Curves under Moderate Transport
Costs and Inelastic Import Demand (τ = 0.2 and ν = 0.5)
account, as in our study here. By contrast, substitution is practically much
less possible — if not, at the extreme, almost impossible — under specialized
production. Given the same preference for consuming the Home and the Foreign
good in equal quantities in both countries, the (cif) value of trade is therefore
artificially inflated so that its share in the value of GDP becomes exaggerated.
As the cost of transporting the imported quantities is paid for but lost in transit
and thus not consumed, (equally weighted) trade-to-output ratios now add up
to (slightly) more than 1, even under peg for any s ∈ S (see Figure 2).
4 Does the Exchange-Rate Regime Matter for
Trade?
Making further use of the CCP vs. PCP equilibrium solutions under a sym-
metric iceberg friction and two distinct substitutabilities aﬀecting consumption
demand we characterized thus far, the present section focuses on the implica-
tions of the alternative monetary arrangements we study for international trade
prices and flows. We analyze both the expected level of trade-to-output ratios
(by country and for the world economy as a whole), the relevant measure of
trade under uncertainty, and their variability across states of nature.
4.1 Trade-to-Output under CCP (with Float or Peg)
We derived national trade shares in equilibrium under CCP with float to be
independent of the nominal exchange rate and, ultimately, of relative money
22
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
5
10
15
20
25
0
0.5
1
1.5
(ft)C
ν τ
Figure 3: Peg Trade Share Surface across Iceberg Costs and Substitutabilities
stocks. CCP trade-to-output ratios are thus invariant across states of nature
and coincide with their expected level. A peg under (full) CCP will therefore
not change anything directly related to trade shares or their volatility in both
an ex-post and ex-ante sense.
Mind, however, that under float CCP by itself does not generally imply equal
equilibrium consumption, hence leisure and utility across countries. This will be
the case only in the much less probable states of monetary shocks of the same
magnitude. A peg under (full) CCP, by equalizing ex-post cross-country utility,
will bring about this additional eﬀect in all states of the world.
4.2 Trade-to-Output under PCP with Float
By contrast, a peg under PCP, implying SPs = 1 for any s ∈ S, will equalize
the ex-post Home and Foreign trade shares, thus leading to a result that is
essentially the same — concerning trade only, not consumption and leisure — as
the one implied by (full) CCP under float. These ”CCP or peg” findings on
the ex-post trade share are illustrated in Figure 3. It summarizes across trade
costs and substitutabilities the identical under CCP (with either float or peg) or
peg (with either CCP or PCP) Home and Foreign equilibrium trade-to-output
ratios.
The CCP or peg trade share function ftC (τ , ν) in Figure 3 is interpreted in
more detail along the dimensions of its two respective determinants in section 5.
But before doing it, it would be insightful to first discuss the eﬀects of relative
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monetary disequilibria, possible under float, on both the expected level of PCP
trade shares and their variability across states, which we do next.
When Does a Peg Increase Trade-to-Output? Our principal theoretical
result in this paper is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Expected Trade Shares under PCP) In addition to stabilizing
trade-to-output across states of nature under PCP, a peg would at the same time
reduce its expected level for both countries and, hence, for the world as a whole
under elastic import demand but increase it under inelastic import demand.
Given claims in the preceding literature, mostly empirical and notably exem-
plified by Rose (1999), as mentioned in the beginning, one would rather expect
that a peg will increase trade. Theoretical work in Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(1998, 2000) has warned that this is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, Mi-
hailov (2003) has shown in a PCP extension to Bacchetta-van Wincoop’s (2000)
CCP benchmark that alternative price-setting assumptions impose a distinction
between the eﬀects on the exchange-rate regime on expected trade, which is nil
under frictionless, unique substitutability symmetry, and on its volatility, which
is important in that a peg would stabilize national trade-to-output that are
state-dependent under PCP. It turns out from our present richer extension of
the quoted theoretical papers that the eﬀect of the exchange-rate regime on
both expected trade shares and their variability ultimately depends on whether
import demand is elastic or inelastic once some key non-monetary determinants
of trade have been explicitly modelled as well, like we did here.
In interpreting our major finding, i.e. Proposition 4, we would first note
that our trade measure is a ratio, not the value or volume of trade in general, as
in many studies usually claiming that a peg would increase trade. Second, we
would recall that in a frictionless, unique-substitutability setting with trade of
highly similar brands of a homogeneous good-type imposing elastic demands for
imports, as in our baseline in Mihailov (2003), the expected trade share is the
same with float and peg, under CCP as well as under PCP. The introduction
of more realistic features such as, in particular, costs of trade and a distinct
substitutability between good-types lower than that among brands (within each
type) that is, furthermore, not restricted outside the inelastic zone has thus
helped enrich and clarify our understanding on the eﬀect of the exchange-rate
regime on trade measured in terms of output. Moreover, the presence of any
one of these two real trade fundamentals in the extended model alone is not
suﬃcient to produce the reversal eﬀect of interest here, as we discuss below.
The intuition for the result in Proposition 4 we would provide is the fol-
lowing. We showed that a peg under PCP eliminates pass-through and, hence,
expenditure switching. But in all ”bad” states of nature, i.e. when a relative
monetary contraction hits a country, appreciating its national currency, import
substitution of cheaper imports becomes optimal for consumers under PCP;29
29We also discussed why under CCP the expenditure switching channel is closed, so no
import substitution occurs at all.
24
the more so when substitutability is high, that is, when the brands produced by
the diﬀerent countries are similar. So if cross-country consumption demand is
elastic, ν > 1, there is some amount of import-substituting trade which is ulti-
mately prevented by a peg, relative to a float (under the same jointly symmetric
distribution of money shocks). If however, demand is inelastic, 0 < ν < 1, there
are no incentives for consumers to substitute the domestic product by importing
it in the ”bad” states of nature of appreciated currency, so there is some loss
of potential trade in these states under a float which a peg could somewhat
”restore”. We would point out to the fact that the reversal of the eﬀect of
the exchange-rate regime on expected trade-to-GDP in the inelastic region of
the cross-country substitutability parameter is only possible given that trade
frictions, in our case modelled through iceberg costs, are also accounted for ex-
plicitly: it is precisely the interaction of ν and τ that drives the result.30 So it
is the combination of the wedge driven between the cost of the domestic vs. the
foreign product, intervening in decisions on import substitution, and the partic-
ular magnitude of the substitutability between these products, embodying the
wish to trade and inducing, in consequence, a certain level of the equilibrium
PCP NER in each state, that ultimately matters in explaining when a peg would
increase trade and when a float would do it instead. Without the richer setting
of the present extended model this channel of interaction could not have been
uncovered, and in this consists the principal import of our theoretical work.
How Much Does the Exchange-Rate Regime Matter for Trade-to-
Output? To further judge about the likely magnitude of the eﬀect of the
exchange-rate regime on expected trade we established in Proposition 4 and at
the same time to explore how money-stock volatility translates into variabil-
ity of the resulting trade-to-output ratios, we next simulated our model under
jointly symmetric national money-growth disturbances. Having in mind that
our framework was set-up assuming price stickiness, in line with the NOEM
approach we follow here, we were interested in, and imposed in the simula-
tion, low monetary uncertainty. The outcomes across a few sets of parameter
constellations are reported in Table 1.31
Now looking at the last column of Table 1, the first regularity one notices is
related to the sign of what we have defined as the gain for expected world trade
30As clear from the changing sign of the second term of F 00 (1) in the Proof of Proposition
4 in Appendix B, the first one being always positive.
31The money-stock growth shocks (µs, µ∗s) underlying the numbers in Table 1 were sim-
ulated 100 times from two independent (continuous) uniform distributions on the unit in-
terval, U (0, 1), one for Home and the other for Foreign. We then centered the shocks
around 0, according to what we assumed in our no-(productivity)-growth NOEM model
here, and discretized them. In discretizing, we used a small step to obtain ”realistic” un-
certainty, i.e. with a great (in fact, 10201 = 101 × 101) number of possible states, but at
the same time limited the range of the latter to comply with price rigidity, namely by using
Ul (−5.0,−4.9, ...,−0.1, 0, 0.1, ..., 4.9, 5.0). The equally-spaced values inside the parentheses
defining the uniform distribution, the same for Home and Foreign, we simulated are directly
interpretable as growth rates of the money stock in percentages, that is, as −0.1% or 4.9%,
for instance. The GAUSS programs as well as more details on the algorithm of computations
and on the results are available upon request.
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(Ms,M∗s ) ; ν, τ - Cif Trade Shares in Output, % Peg Gain
(µs, µ
∗
s) ∈ determined NER: PCP-cum-Float CCP⇔Peg for World
Ul (−5, 5) PCP-cum-Float Mean SD constant Trade over
Mean SD H F H F H = F Float, %
Panel I: (very) low transport costs: τ = 0.01
ν = 11 0.9997 0.0035 95.14 94.82 1.74 1.74 94.98 −0.0016
ν = 2 0.9983 0.0200 99.59 99.40 1.00 1.00 99.50 −0.0001
ν = 0.5 0.9957 0.0800 100.06 100.44 2.00 2.00 100.25 0.0001
ν = 0.2 1.0008 0.2005 99.66 101.14 7.84 7.84 100.40 0.0025
Panel II: moderate transport costs: τ = 0.2
ν = 11 0.9998 0.0021 19.43 19.36 0.37 0.37 19.39 −0.0161
ν = 2 0.9984 0.0190 88.98 88.80 0.94 0.94 88.89 −0.0011
ν = 0.5 0.9957 0.0760 105.39 105.75 1.89 1.89 105.57 0.0019
ν = 0.2 0.9970 0.1491 108.32 109.42 5.85 5.85 108.90 0.0281
Panel III: (very) high transport costs: τ = 0.6
ν = 11 0.9998 0.0019 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 −0.0223
ν = 2 0.9986 0.0165 57.21 57.08 0.67 0.67 57.14 −0.0042
ν = 0.5 0.9960 0.0654 122.36 122.65 1.55 1.55 122.51 0.0047
ν = 0.2 0.9956 0.0835 134.79 135.33 2.92 2.92 135.09 0.0252
Table 1: Gains from Peg/Float for World Trade: Simulation Summary
as a share in world output from a peg regime relative to a float. This measure is
simply the percentage diﬀerence between the peg trade share constant and the
expected trade-to-GDP under float, the latter taken as a base (i.e. normalized to
100). A positive diﬀerence is thus a trade gain from fixed exchange-rate regime
whereas a negative sign means the opposite, namely that a flexible exchange-rate
regime would bring about more international trade relative to world output. The
simulation has thus, first of all, cross-checked and confirmed our conclusions that
were formally proved in Proposition 4: under elastic demand (i.e. for ν = 11 and
ν = 2 in Table 1, no matter what the particular value of τ is) a peg does reduce
trade, but only slightly — and this is the new point here, coming out from the
simulation; and under inelastic demand, it does increase expected trade share
in GDP for the world economy as a whole, but — again — only slightly. ”Only
slightly” means more precisely by less than 1%, i.e. up to about 3 basis points,32
as clear from the table.
Our qualitatively important theoretical finding has thus ”crashed” into a
quantitatively insignificant magnitude: for all practical or policy purposes, it
will therefore be diﬃcult to rely on the above result... Yet this particular quan-
tification of the first-order eﬀect, on expected trade-to-output, of a second -order
model feature, namely monetary uncertainty embodied in the driving shocks,
does not go astray from similar conclusions in related NOEM papers. It is true
that the magnitude of the exchange-rate eﬀect is tiny compared to the impact of
32A basis point is 1
100
of 1%.
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trade costs or import demand elasticity themselves. But that is a point common
for the whole literature about the eﬀects of uncertainty: on trade shares, in our
case, but also on the conduct of monetary policy or on the welfare of peg. vs.
float. Once uncertainty is driven by monetary shocks — as in our present work
but also in research by others, for instance Devereux and Engel (1998, 1999,
2000) — these shocks are just not that large empirically (or when simulated, as
we did here, to comply with our assumption of sticky prices), hence there is no
way that they will result in a large eﬀect.
The key import of our extended analysis is thus in the conclusion that un-
der PCP with trade costs interacting with somewhat more structured prefer-
ences (and, ultimately, import demand), monetary uncertainty has a first-order
eﬀect on trade-to-GDP, be it a tiny one, whereas in a frictionless or single-
substitutability model — e.g. Mihailov (2003) or Bacchetta - van Wincoop (2000)
— such a channel cannot be captured and explained. Moreover, our quantifica-
tion of the eﬀect of peg vs. float on the expected trade share is completely of
the order of magnitude of similar eﬀects, such as those recently reported in a
policy-oriented paper by Devereux, Engel and Tille (2003), for example. To
quote them exactly, on page 237 of the cited reference they write: ”The ac-
tual gains in expected consumption and reduction in expected employment are
small (e.g. when ρ = 2, the gain in expected consumption in Europe is 0.02%,
and the reduction in expected employment in Europe and the United States is
0.004%)”.
5 The Role of Trade Costs and Import Demand
Elasticity
We finally turn to the role of major real determinants such as trade costs and
import demand (in)elasticity in the determination of trade shares, as essentially
reflected in Figure 3 and Table 1.
5.1 Trade Frictions
The magnitude of the trade friction in combination with that of import demand
elasticity defines the consumption bias (1− τ)1−ν and, ultimately, the state-
invariant trade share (ft)C under CCP or peg. Our Proposition 4 has shown
that under float the expected trade share is slightly higher or lower this constant,
depending on whether import demand is inelastic or elastic, respectively.
We first examine the impact of transport costs. Figure 4, in fact a two-
dimensional variation of Figure 3, shows the peg trade share (in Home as well
as in Foreign) as a function of τ for seven diﬀerent levels of ν. We can see that
for given elastic import demand, higher transport costs decrease — decreasingly
for ν = 11 or ν = 6 and increasingly for ν = 2 or ν = 1.25 — the expected level of
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Figure 4: Peg Trade Share Curves across Iceberg Costs for Given Substitutabil-
ity
trade-to-output.33 But inelastic imports (ν = 0.75 or ν = 0.5 or ν = 0) reverse
this conclusion: as evident on the upper part of figure 4, higher trade frictions
always lead to an increasing — but ”inflated”, as we are going to next make it
clear — growth (see also the last but one column in all three panels of Table 1).
The above reversal result is not so intuitively natural and needs a word of
comment. In such a parameter region national output mixes are so poor substi-
tutes that both countries are ”doomed”, by their taste (or need) for diversity
under complete specialization, to trade even when shipping losses are very high
(or exogenously rise). For a given level of transport costs under float, the trade
share in output would thus be almost insensitive to ex-ante price discrimination
under CCP or ex-post expenditure switching under PCP, since households prac-
tically cannot substitute away from imports into the (now completely diﬀerent)
home-produced good-type. The essential reason for our finding that, even under
peg, with inelastic import demand national trade shares would both be higher
than 1 (see again Figure 2) is that the value of nominal trade taking account
of shipment costs (cif ) divided by nominal output was used to derive them.34
This latter ratio is highly inflated by the ”true” price to the consumer of the
huge percentage of output lost in transit.35
33 It follows from our analysis that space (or geography) matters, as in gravity models of
trade, in particular if transport costs are modelled to be some positive function of distance
(as we have implicitly assumed here).
34Recall (34) under CCP and (35) under PCP in Appendix A.4 for Home; the respective
definitions for Foreign are, of course, symmetric.
35Note that there is no way to measure instead trade-to-GDP in terms of the exchanged
quantities ultimately consumed relative to the produced ones in each country,
c∗H,s+cF,s
cH,s+
c∗H,s
1−τ
for
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For the moderate (τ = 0.2) to high (τ = 0.6) iceberg costs we are particularly
interested in, simulations have furthermore indicated that lower shipment losses
tend to increase trade share volatility (which becomes clear from comparing the
standard deviation columns of panels II and III in Table 1).36
As already discussed, another major role of transport costs is to generate
a home bias in goods consumption. Even when monetary policies are coordi-
nated under a peg, or in a monetary union, and the participating countries fully
symmetric, there is in general an optimally lower demand for foreign-produced
products. Such a home bias originates in the trade friction and thus indepen-
dently of the specification of preferences (Proposition 2). A higher cross-country
consumption substitutability then additionally exacerbates it (Proposition 2,
again).
5.2 Cross-Country Substitutability
We now summarize how the degree of substitutability aﬀects trade. Figure 5 —
which is another two-dimensional perspective of Figure 3 earlier — shows that,
for any given iceberg costs, lower substitutability increases the expected value
of the trade-to-output ratio common to both countries (see also the last but one
column of panels I, II and III in Table 1). Another finding which stands out
clearly in this graph is that as τ increases from 0 to 1 (near-)linearity of the
peg trade share as a function of ν gradually transforms itself into a steeper and
more convex curve.
For moderate to high shipment losses, lower substitutability also increases
the volatility of trade shares across states of nature (cf. the standard deviation
columns in each of panels II and III of Table 1). The intuition is that in this case
consumers cannot substitute as much as they like to and would, ceteris paribus,
so the resulting trade values measured inclusive of transport losses (that is, cif )
inflate trade shares in output as defined for our purposes here and as already
explained above.
Note, however, that for tiny costs of transport (τ = 0.01) as in Panel I
of Table 1 the relation in question appears not to be monotone. Instead, we
have a divergence of simulated volatility away from 0 which corresponds to the
widely-exploited in NOEM unit substitutability special case, ν = 1, into higher
magnitudes in both directions: ν →∞ and ν → 0.
6 Concluding Comments
The model we developed here is useful to study the role of monetary uncertainty
under trade frictions and import demand elasticity in determining the eﬀects
Home and
cF,s+c∗H,s
c∗F,s+
c∗F,s
1−τ
and for Foreign, because one cannot add up ”apples to oranges”.
36When tiny transport frictions (τ = 0.01) are allowed for as well (see Panel I of Table
1), there is, however, no monotone function describing the relation discussed here, so trade
variability generally depends on the particular parameter constellation.
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of the exchange-rate regime on trade relative to output. Given symmetry of
structures and shocks, we distinguished two types of eﬀects, namely an expected
level (or first-order) eﬀect and a volatility (or second -order) eﬀect.
Expected Level Eﬀects Our unified NOEM framework designed to nest
trade in both similar and diﬀerent output mixes has clearly indicated when a
peg would increase expected trade, the relevant measure in a stochastic setting
as ours here, relative to a float and when not. A peg increases expected trade-to-
output under inelastic import demand for a diﬀerent foreign good-type valued
equally as the domestic one and decreases it under elastic demand for similar
composites produced in various brands across two symmetric economies. We
have also concluded that this eﬀect, although qualitatively novel and important,
is quantitatively very weak, as already established in other models within the
NOEM literature examining welfare issues. By contrast, a strong eﬀect on
the magnitude of the expected trade share in GDP has been found for some
deeper trade ”fundamentals” such as transport or tariﬀ frictions and cross-
country good-type substitutability, which is another contribution of the present
paper. More precisely, such real determinants aﬀect — via the optimally arising
home bias — both the expected level of trade-to-output and its volatility across
states, in a diﬀerent way under elastic vs. inelastic import demand. Some
of these trade fundamentals can relatively quickly be aﬀected by policy (e.g.
tariﬀs). Changing the structural underpinnings of other would, by contrast,
take more time (e.g. transportation technologies or preferences).
Variability Eﬀects What fixing the exchange rate can achieve under PCP
(but not CCP) — by shutting down the pass-through and expenditure-switching
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channel — is to stabilize and equalize national trade shares across states of na-
ture at their expected level. Our simulations have indicated that how much
trade stabilization would be achieved by a passage from a fixed to a flexible
exchange-rate regime ultimately depends on both monetary and real trade de-
terminants. Within the perspective of actual-world economies and as a lesson
for policy, the degree of trade share variability thus eliminated would be greater
for (symmetric) nations, or currency unions, which (i) have a larger proportion
of PCP in their (bilateral) trade, (ii) are exposed to higher monetary uncer-
tainty and — for moderate to high costs of international exchange — (iii) produce
less substitutable outputs and (iv) are located closer to one another or apply
weaker (reciprocal) tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ restrictions. Therefore, the lesser the
extent to which these conditions are met, the less eﬃcient would a peg be as an
instrument in stabilizing trade, simultaneously equalizing the ex-post utility of
the ex-ante identical residents.
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A Optimization and Equilibrium
A.1 Households Optimization Problem
The details of households consumption basket optimization in each realized state
of nature s diﬀer across our price-setting assumptions, so we present in turn the
CCP and the PCP cases.
CCP Optimization of Home Households Under CCP, a H house-
hold’s j ∈ [0, 1] total real consumption demand is defined by a Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) aggregator of the following form:
cj,Cs ≡
·¡
1
2
¢ 1
ν
³
cj,CH,s
´ ν−1
ν
+
¡
1
2
¢ 1
ν
³
cj,CF,s
´ ν−1
ν
¸ νν−1
, ∀s ∈ S
Standard representative household’s cost minimization ex-post, i.e. under
certainty for any realized state of nature s, then progressively derives the ex-
pressions reported in the summary tables below.
CCP: H Domestic Absorption (cj,Ci,s → cCH,s) and PPI (PCi → PCH )
Aggregation
CCP Summary Table 1H
cj,Ci,s , P
C
i , j ∈ [0, 1] , i ∈ [0, 1] , ∀s ∈ S¡
1HH
¢
cj,CH,s ≡
·
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´ϕ−1
ϕ
di
¸ ϕϕ−1
by index definition¡
2HH
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CCP: H Import Demand (cj,Ci∗,s → cCF,s) and Import Price Index
(PCi∗ → PCF ) Aggregation
CCP Summary Table 2H
cj,Ci∗,s, P
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CCP: H CPI
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CCP Summary Table 3H
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CCP Optimization of Foreign Households Under CCP, a F house-
hold’s j∗ ∈ (1, 2] total real consumption demand is analogously (or symmetri-
cally) defined by the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator:
cj
∗,C
s ≡
·¡
1
2
¢ 1
ν
³
cj
∗,C
F,s
´ ν−1
ν
+
¡
1
2
¢ 1
ν
³
cj
∗,C
H,s
´ ν−1
ν
¸ νν−1
, ∀s ∈ S
Standard representative household’s cost minimization under certainty, i.e.
for any realized state of nature s, then progressively derives the expressions
below for Foreign that parallel (or, more precisely, are the mirror image of)
those for Home.
33
CCP: F Domestic Absorption (cj∗,Ci∗,s → c
∗,C
F,s ) and PPI (P
∗,C
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F )
Aggregation
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P∗,CH
´−ϕ∗ ³P∗,CH
P∗,C
´−ν M∗s
P∗,C
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CCP: F CPI
¡
P ∗,C
¢
Aggregation
CCP Summary Table 3F
P ∗,C , i∗ ∈ [1, 2] ∪ i ∈ [0, 1] , ∀s ∈ S¡
6FC
¢
P ∗,C ≡
·
1
2
³
P ∗,CF
´1−ν
+ 12
³
P ∗,CH
´1−ν¸ 11−ν
¡
6aFC
¢
P ∗,C ≡

1
2
(·
2R
1
³
P ∗,Ci∗
´1−ϕ∗
di∗
¸ 1
1−ϕ∗
)1−ν
+
1
2
(·
1R
0
³
P ∗,Ci
´1−ϕ∗
di
¸ 1
1−ϕ∗
)1−ν

1
1−ν
PCP Optimization ofHome Households Under PCP, aH household’s
j ∈ [0, 1] total real consumption demand is again defined by a Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) index of the same form as under CCP but with diﬀerent resulting do-
mestic and external demands for goods (hence the P superscript indexing for
PCP now in place of the C superscript indexing for CCP earlier) :
cj,Ps ≡
·¡
1
2
¢ 1
ν
³
cj,PH,s
´ ν−1
ν
+
¡
1
2
¢ 1
ν
³
cj,PF,s
´ ν−1
ν
¸ νν−1
, ∀s ∈ S
Standard representative household’s cost minimization ex-post, i.e. for any
realized state of nature s, derives again the expressions in the summary tables
below that parallel those reported for the CCP model version.
PCP: H Domestic Absorption (cj,Pi,s → cPH,s) and PPI (PPi → PPH )
Aggregation
PCP Summary Table 1H
cj,Pi,s , P
P
i,s, j ∈ [0, 1] , i ∈ [0, 1] , ∀s ∈ S¡
1HH
¢
cj,PH,s ≡
·
1R
0
³
cj,Pi,s
´ϕ−1
ϕ
di
¸ ϕϕ−1
by index definition¡
2HH
¢
PPi given (preset in HC by a H firm i) ⇔ state-independent¡
3HHP
¢
cj,Pi,s =
³
PPi
PPH
´−ϕ
cj,PH,s ⇒ cPi,s =
³
PPi
PPH
´−ϕ
cPH,s¡
4HH
¢
PPH ≡
·
1R
0
¡
PPi
¢1−ϕ
di
¸ 1
1−ϕ
defined as the price of a unit of cPH,s¡
5HHP
¢
cj,PH,s =
1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ν Mjs
PPs
⇒ cPH,s = 12
³
PPH
PPs
´−ν
Ms
PPs¡
3aHHP
¢
cj,Pi,s =
1
2
³
PPi
PPH
´−ϕ ³PPH
PPs
´−ν Mjs
PPs
⇒ cPi,s = 12
³
PPi
PPH
´−ϕ ³PPH
PPs
´−ν
Ms
PPs
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PCP: H Import Demand (cj,Pi∗,s → cPF,s) and Import Price Index
(P ∗,Pi∗
SPs→ PPi∗,s → PPF,s) Aggregation
PCP Summary Table 2H
cj,Pi∗,s, P
∗,P
i∗
SPs→ PPi∗,s, j ∈ [0, 1] , i∗ ∈ [1, 2] , ∀s ∈ S¡
1HF
¢
cj,PF,s ≡
·
2R
1
³
cj,Pi∗,s
´ϕ−1
ϕ
di∗
¸ ϕϕ−1
by index definition¡
2HF P
¢
P ∗,Pi∗ given (preset in FC by a F firm i
∗) ⇔ state independent¡
3HF P
¢
cj,Pi∗,s =
µ
P∗,Pi∗
P∗,PF
¶−ϕ
cj,PF,s ⇒ cPi∗,s =
µ
P∗,Pi∗
P∗,PF
¶−ϕ
cPF,s
¡
4HF P
¢ SPs P ∗,PF
1− τ| {z }
≡PPF,s
≡


2R
1
Ã
SPs P
∗,P
i∗
1− τ
!
| {z }
≡PPi∗,s
1−ϕ
di∗


1
1−ϕ
defined as the price of a unit of cPF,s
¡
5HF P
¢
cj,PF,s =
1
2


≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Mjs
PPs
⇒ cPF,s = 12


≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
¡
3aHF P
¢
cj,Pi∗,s =
1
2
µ
P∗,Pi∗
P∗,PF
¶−ϕ


≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Mjs
PPs
⇒ cPi∗,s = 12
µ
P∗,Pi∗
P∗,PF
¶−ϕ


≡PPF,sz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
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PCP: H CPI
¡
PPs
¢
Aggregation
PCP Summary Table 3H
PPs , i ∈ [0, 1] ∪ i∗ ∈ [1, 2] , ∀s ∈ S¡
6HP
¢
PPs ≡
h
1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ν
+ 12
¡
PPF,s
¢1−νi 11−ν ≡
≡
·
1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ν
+ 12
³
SPs P
∗,P
F
1−τ
´1−ν¸ 11−ν
¡
6aHP
¢
PPs ≡

1
2
(·
1R
0
¡
PPi
¢1−ϕ
di
¸ 1
1−ϕ
)1−ν
+
1
2
(·
2R
1
¡
PPi∗,s
¢1−ϕ
di∗
¸ 1
1−ϕ
)1−ν

1
1−ν
≡
≡

1
2
(·
1R
0
¡
PPi
¢1−ϕ
di
¸ 1
1−ϕ
)1−ν
+
1
2



"
2R
1
µ
SPs P
∗,P
i∗
1−τ
¶1−ϕ
di∗
# 1
1−ϕ



1−ν

1
1−ν
PCP Optimization of Foreign Households Under PCP, a F house-
hold’s j∗ ∈ (1, 2] total real consumption demand is defined, analogously to that
of a H household j ∈ [0, 1], by a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) index of the same form:
cj
∗,P
s ≡
·¡
1
2
¢ 1
ν
³
cj
∗,P
F,s
´ ν−1
ν
+
¡
1
2
¢ 1
ν
³
cj
∗,P
H,s
´ ν−1
ν
¸ νν−1
, ∀s ∈ S
Standard representative household’s cost minimization under certainty, i.e.
for any realized state of nature s, then derives the expressions in the summary
tables that follow.
PCP: F Domestic Absorption (cj∗,Pi∗,s → c
∗,P
F,s ) and PPI (P
∗,P
i∗ → P
∗,P
F )
Aggregation
PCP Summary Table 1F
cj
∗,P
i∗,s , P
∗,P
i∗ , j
∗ ∈ [1, 2] , i∗ ∈ [1, 2] , ∀s ∈ S
¡
1FF
¢
cj
∗,P
F,s ≡
"
2R
1
³
cj
∗,P
i∗,s
´ϕ∗−1
ϕ∗
di∗
# ϕ∗
ϕ∗−1
by index definition¡
2FF
¢
P ∗,Pi∗ given (preset in FC by a F firm i
∗) ⇔ state-independent¡
3FFP
¢
cj
∗,P
i∗,s =
µ
P∗,Pi∗
P∗,PF
¶−ϕ∗
cj
∗,P
F,s ⇒ c
∗,P
i∗,s =
µ
P∗,Pi∗
P∗,PF
¶−ϕ∗
c∗,PF,s¡
4FF
¢
P ∗,PF ≡
·
2R
1
³
P ∗,Pi∗
´1−ϕ∗
di∗
¸ 1
1−ϕ∗
defined as the price of a unit of c∗,PF,s¡
5FFP
¢
cj
∗,P
F,s =
1
2
³
P∗,PF
P∗,Ps
´−ν M∗,j∗s
P∗,Ps
⇒ c∗,PF,s = 12
³
P∗,PF
P∗,Ps
´−ν M∗s
P∗,Ps¡
3aFFP
¢
cj
∗,P
i∗,s =
1
2
µ
P∗,Pi∗
P∗,PF
¶−ϕ∗ ³
P∗,PF
P∗,Ps
´−ν M∗,j∗s
P∗,Ps
⇒ c∗,Pi∗,s = 12
µ
P∗,Pi∗
P∗,PF
¶−ϕ∗ ³
P∗,PF
P∗,Ps
´−ν M∗s
P∗,Ps
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PCP: F Import Demand (cj
∗,P
i,s → c
∗,P
H,s) and Import Price Index
(PPi
SPs→ P ∗,Pi,s → P
∗,P
H,s ) Aggregation
PCP Summary Table 2F
cj
∗,P
i,s , P
P
i
SPs→ P ∗,Pi,s , j∗ ∈ [1, 2] , i ∈ [0, 1] , ∀s ∈ S¡
1FH
¢
cj
∗,P
H,s ≡
"
1R
0
³
cj
∗,P
i,s
´ϕ∗−1
ϕ∗
di
# ϕ∗
ϕ∗−1
by index definition¡
2FHP
¢
PPi given (preset in HC by a H firm i) ⇔ state-independent¡
3FHP
¢
cj
∗,P
i,s =
³
PPi
PPH
´−ϕ∗
cj
∗,P
H,s ⇒ c
∗,P
i,s =
³
PPi
PPH
´−ϕ∗
c∗,PH,s
¡
4FHP
¢ PH
SPs (1− τ)| {z }
≡P∗,PH,s
≡


1R
0
µ
Pi
SPs (1− τ)
¶
| {z }
≡P∗,Pi,s
1−ϕ∗
di


1
1−ϕ∗
defined as the price of a unit of c∗,PH,s
¡
5FHP
¢
c
j∗,P
H,s =
1
2


≡P∗,PH,sz }| {
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
P∗,Ps


−ν
M∗,j
∗
s
P∗,Ps
⇒ c∗,PH,s = 12


≡P∗,PH,sz }| {
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
P∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P∗,Ps
¡
3aFHP
¢
cj
∗,P
i,s =
1
2
³
PPi
PPH
´−ϕ∗


≡P∗,PH,sz }| {
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
P∗,Ps


−ν
M∗,j
∗
s
P∗,Ps
⇒ cPi,s = 12
³
PPi
PPH
´−ϕ∗


≡P∗,PH,sz }| {
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
P∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P∗,Ps
PCP: F CPI
¡
P ∗,Ps
¢
Aggregation
PCP Summary Table 3F
P ∗,Ps , i
∗ ∈ [1, 2] ∪ i ∈ [0, 1] , ∀s ∈ S¡
6FP
¢
P ∗,Ps ≡
·
1
2
³
P ∗,PF
´1−ν
+ 12
³
P ∗,PH,s
´1−ν¸ 11−ν
≡
≡
·
1
2
³
P ∗,PF
´1−ν
+ 12
³
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
´1−ν¸ 11−ν
¡
6aFP
¢
P ∗,Ps ≡

1
2
(·
1R
0
³
P ∗,Pi∗
´1−ϕ∗
di∗
¸ 1
1−ϕ∗
)1−ν
+
1
2
(·
2R
1
³
P ∗,Pi,s
´1−ϕ∗
di
¸ 1
1−ϕ∗
)1−ν

1
1−ν
≡
≡

1
2
(·
1R
0
³
P ∗,Pi∗
´1−ϕ∗
di∗
¸ 1
1−ϕ∗
)1−ν
+
1
2
(·
2R
1
³
PPi
SPs (1−τ)
´1−ϕ∗
di
¸ 1
1−ϕ∗
)1−ν

1
1−ν
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A.2 Definition of Equilibrium
We now formally define an equilibrium concept that corresponds to the described
sequential optimization.
Definition 1 In the context of the model versions we presented, an equilibrium
is a set of quantities and prices, such that:
1. [Ex-Ante Conditions] before the resolution of monetary uncertainty
and given the commonly agreed upon joint symmetric distribution of money
growth shocks (µs, µ
∗
s);
(a) [Firms Stochastic Optimization] given their technology constraint and
the expected quantities demanded in the goods market,
©
E0
£
cCH,s
¤
,
E0
h
c∗,CH,s
i
, E0
h
c∗,CF,s
i
, E0
£
cCF,s
¤ª
under CCP or
©
E0
£
cPH,s
¤
, E0
h
c∗,PH,s
i
,
E0
h
c∗,PF,s
i
, E0
£
cPF,s
¤ª
under PCP, the prices,
©
PCH , P
∗,C
H , P
∗,C
F , P
C
F
ª
under CCP or
©
PPH , P
∗,P
F
o
under PCP, that are optimally preset ex-
ante (i.e. in state 0) and bindingly posted to consumer households for
transactions ex-post (in state s for ∀s ∈ S) solve the profit maximiza-
tion problem of the representative producer firm in Home as well as
in Foreign;
2. [Ex-Post Conditions] following the resolution of monetary uncertainty
and in any state of nature s ∈ S that has materialized;
(a) [Households Labor-Leisure Trade-Oﬀ ] given its constraints and the
posted prices,
©
PCH , P
∗,C
H , P
∗,C
F , P
C
F
ª
under CCP or
©
PPH , P
∗,P
F
o
under PCP, the representative consumer household in Home as well
as in Foreign spends up all available cash on its total real consump-
tion {cs, c∗s}; hours of work (employment) {1− ls , 1− l∗s} are sup-
plied by households until firms demand labor to equilibrate ex-post
consumption demand for their diﬀerentiated products at the resulting
equilibrium real wage rates
½
Ws
Ps
,
W ∗s
P ∗s
¾
;
(b) [Households Consumer Basket Allocation] given the posted prices,©
PCH , P
∗,C
H , P
∗,C
F , P
C
F
ª
under CCP or
©
PPH , P
∗,P
F
o
under PCP, the
consumption quantities
©
cCH,s , c
∗,C
H,s, c
∗,C
F,s , c
C
F,s
ª
under CCP or
©
cPH,s ,
c∗,PH,s, c
∗,P
F,s , c
P
F,s
ª
under PCP solve the cost minimization problem à
la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) of the representative consumer household in
Home as well as in Foreign;
(c) [Goods Market Clearing] all quantities under CCP or PCP satisfy the
feasibility conditions for each diﬀerentiated brand so that all product-
brand markets — and, hence, the international product-type market as
a whole — clear;
(d) [Forex Market Clearing] the international forex market clears as well.
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A.3 Equilibrium Nominal Exchange Rate
CCP Under CCP, the equilibrium (ex-post) NER solves the foreign exchange
market clearing condition: excess supply of each of the two currencies (expressed
in the same monetary unit) is zero in any state of nature s that has materialized.
Taking the currency of H as the common unit of account, SCs is determined by:
PCF c
C
F,s| {z }
F export revenues ⇔ HCsupply
− SCs · P ∗,CH c∗,CH,s| {z }
H export revenues ⇔ HCdemand
= 0
Substituting for optimal cCF,s and c
∗,C
H,s above as well as for the ideal H and
F CPI definitions further on in the algebraic manipulation derives:
PCF
1
2
µ
PCF
PC
¶−ν
Ms
PC| {z }
=cCF,s
= SCs P
∗,C
H
1
2
Ã
P ∗,CH
P ∗,C
!−ν
M∗s
P ∗,C| {z }
=c∗,CH,s
SCs =
µ
PCF
PC
¶1−ν
Ã
P ∗,CH
P ∗,C
!1−ν MsM∗s
SCs =


PCF"µ
1
2
¡
PCH
¢1−ν
+
1
2
¡
PCF
¢1−ν¶ 11−ν #
| {z }
≡PC


1−ν


P ∗,CH"µ
1
2
³
P ∗,CF
´1−ν
+
1
2
³
P ∗,CH
´1−ν¶ 11−ν #
| {z }
≡P∗,C


1−ν
Ms
M∗s
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SCs =
¡
PCF
¢1−ν
1
2
¡
PCH
¢1−ν
+
1
2
¡
PCF
¢1−ν³
P ∗,CH
´1−ν
1
2
³
P ∗,CF
´1−ν
+
1
2
³
P ∗,CH
´1−ν
Ms
M∗s
=
¡
PCF
¢1−ν
1
2
h¡
PCH
¢1−ν
+
¡
PCF
¢1−νi³
P ∗,CH
´1−ν
1
2
·³
P ∗,CF
´1−ν
+
³
P ∗,CH
´1−ν¸
Ms
M∗s
SCs =
¡
PCF
¢1−ν¡
PCH
¢1−ν
+
¡
PCF
¢1−ν³
P ∗,CH
´1−ν
³
P ∗,CF
´1−ν
+
³
P ∗,CH
´1−ν
Ms
M∗s
=
1
(PCH )
1−ν
+(PCF )
1−ν
(PCF )
1−ν
1
(P∗,CF )
1−ν
+(P∗,CH )
1−ν
(P∗,CH )
1−ν
Ms
M∗s
SCs =
1
(PCH )
1−ν
(PCF )
1−ν + 1
1
(P∗,CF )
1−ν
(P∗,CH )
1−ν + 1
Ms
M∗s
=
1
(PCH )
1−ν
(PCF )
1−ν + 1
(P∗,CF )
1−ν
(P∗,CH )
1−ν + 1
1
Ms
M∗s
SCs =
1 +
³
P∗,CF
P∗,CH
´1−ν
1 +
³
PCH
PCF
´1−ν
+ 1
Ms
M∗s
Now using the price equalities established earlier, namely PH = P ∗H = P
∗
F =
P ∗F to substitute above, one obtains:
Ss =
Ms
M∗s
which is the CCP expression in (21).
PCP Under PCP, the equilibrium (ex-post) NER solves, analogously to the
CCP case, the foreign exchange market clearing condition. Taking again the
monetary unit of H as the numéraire for the purposes of conversion, SPs is
determined by:
SPs ·
P ∗F c
P
F,s
1− τ| {z }
F export revenues ⇔ HCsupply
−
PHc
∗,P
H,s
1− τ| {z }
H export revenues ⇔ HCdemand
= 0
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SPs c
P
F,s = c
∗,P
H,s
SPs
=cPF,sz }| {
1
2
Ã
PPF,s
PPs
!−ν
Ms
PPs
=
=c∗,PH,sz }| {
1
2
Ã
P ∗,PH,s
P ∗,Ps
!−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
SPs


SPs P
∗
F
1−τ
PPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
=
Ã PH
SPs (1−τ)
P ∗,Ps
!−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
SPs
Ã
SPs P
∗
F
1−τ
PPs
!−ν
Ã
PH
SPs (1−τ)
P∗,Ps
!−ν = M
∗
s
P∗,Ps
Ms
PPs
SPs


SPs P
∗
F
1−τ
PPs
P ∗,Ps
PH
SPs (1−τ)


−ν
=
M∗s
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps
SPs
Ã SPs
1
PPs
P ∗,Ps
1
SPs
!−ν
=
M∗s
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps
SPs
µ¡
SPs
¢2 P ∗,Ps
PPs
¶−ν
=
M∗s
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps
SPs
¡
SPs
¢−2ν µP ∗,Ps
PPs
¶−ν
=
M∗s
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps¡
SPs
¢1−2ν µ PPs
P ∗,Ps
¶ν
=
M∗s
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps¡
SPs
¢1−2ν
=
M∗s
Ms
µ
PPs
P ∗,Ps
¶1−ν
SPs =
µ
M∗s
Ms
¶ 1
1−2ν
µ
PPs
P ∗,Ps
¶ 1−ν
1−2ν
(33)
Now we use the CPI definitions derived earlier to substitute for their ratio
above:
42
PPs
P ∗,Ps
=
·
1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ν
+ 12
³
SPs P
∗,P
F
(1−τ)
´1−ν¸ 11−ν
·
1
2
³
P ∗,PF
´1−ν
+ 12
³
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
´1−ν¸ 11−ν =
=


1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ν ³
1 +
SPs
1−τ
´1−ν
1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ν ³
1 + 1SPs (1−τ)
´1−ν


1
1−ν
=


³
1 +
SPs
1−τ
´1−ν
³
1 + 1SPs (1−τ)
´1−ν


1
1−ν
So that:
SPs =
µ
M∗s
Ms
¶ 1
1−2ν
µ
PPs
P ∗,Ps
¶ 1−ν
1−2ν
SPs =
µ
M∗s
Ms
¶ 1
1−2ν





³
1 +
SPs
1−τ
´1−ν
³
1 + 1SPs (1−τ)
´1−ν


1
1−ν



1−ν
1−2ν
¡
SPs
¢1−2ν
=
M∗s
Ms
³
1 +
SPs
1−τ
´1−ν
³
1 + 1SPs (1−τ)
´1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−2ν
=
M∗s
Ms
(1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−ν ³1 + SPs1−τ ´1−ν
1 + (1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−2ν
=
M∗s
Ms
¡
SPs
¢1−ν (1− τ)1−ν + ¡SPs ¢1−ν
1 + (1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
1−ν
¡
SPs
¢−ν
=
M∗s
Ms
(1− τ)1−ν +
¡
SPs
¢1−ν
1 + (1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
1−ν
¡
SPs
¢ν
=
Ms
M∗s
1 + (1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν + (SPs )
1−ν
SPs =
"
1 + (1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν + (SPs )
1−ν
# 1
ν µ
Ms
M∗s
¶ 1
ν
,
which is the PCP expression in (21).
Under a peg, i.e. withMs =M∗s for any s ∈ S, one would further on obtain:
43
SPs =
"
1 + (1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν + (SPs )
1−ν
# 1
ν
¡
SPs
¢ν
=
1 + (1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν + (SPs )
1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢ν
+
¡
SPs
¢ν ¡
SPs
¢1−ν
= 1 + (1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢ν
+ SPs = 1 + (1− τ)
1−ν ¡SPs ¢1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν
¡
SPs
¢ν − (1− τ)1−ν ¡SPs ¢1−ν + SPs − 1 = 0,
which is (22) in the main text.
A.4 Equilibrium Trade Shares
With iceberg costs 0 < τ < 1 now taken into account, Home37 CCP vs. PCP
equilibrium trade/GDP ratio is defined by
(ft)CH,s ≡
(FT )CH,s
Y CH,s
=
(Ex )C,cifH,s +(Im )
C,cif
H,s
(DA)CH,s+(Ex )
C,cif
H,s
=
SCs ·
FC cifz }| {
P ∗,CH ·
c o n sum edz}|{
c∗,CH,s +
H C cifz}|{
PCF ·
c o n sum edz}|{
cCF,s
PCH ·cCH,s+SCs ·P
∗,C
H| {z }
FC cif
· c∗,CH,s|{z}
c o n s um ed
=
=
SCs ·
FC fobz }| {
(1− τ)P ∗,CH ·
p ro d u c e dz }| {
c∗,CH,s
1− τ +
HC fobz }| {
(1− τ)PCF ·
p ro d u c edz }| {
cCF,s
1− τ
PCH ·cCH,s+SCs ·(1− τ)P
∗,C
H| {z }
FC fob
·
c∗,CH,s
1− τ| {z }
p ro d u c e d
vs. (34)
(ft)PH,s ≡
(FT )PH,s
Y PH,s
=
≡(Ex )P,cifH,sz }| {
(Ex )P,fobH,s +
≡(Im )P,cifH,sz }| {
(Im)P,fobH,s
(DA)PH,s+(Ex )
P,fob
H,s| {z }
≡(Ex )P,cifH,s
=
HC fobz}|{
PPH
p ro d u c e dz}|{
c∗,PH,s
1−τ +S
P
s
FC fobz }| {
P ∗,PF
p ro d u c e dz}|{
cPF,s
1−τ
PPH c
P
H,s+ P
P
H|{z}
H C fob
c∗,PH,s
1−τ|{z}
p ro d u c e d
=
HC cifz }| {
PPH
1− τ
c o n s um edz}|{
c∗,PH,s +
HC cifz }| {
SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
c o n s um edz}|{
cPF,s
PPH c
P
H,s+
PPH
1− τ| {z }
HC cif
c∗,PH,s|{z}
c o n sum ed
, (35)
37For Foreign, the respective expressions are symmetric.
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where (Ex )C,cifH,s denotes Home exports at cif prices, (Im)
C,cif
H,s Home im-
ports at cif prices and (DA)CH,s Home domestic absorption, with all these three
values (prices multiplied by quantities) expressed in Home currency under CCP
for any state s ∈ S that has materialized. (Ex )P,fobH,s , (Im)
P,fob
H,s and (DA)
P
H,s
are, of course, the respective Home-currency values under PCP, with Home ex-
ports and imports now measured at fob prices. It is important to recall at this
point that once a transport and/or tariﬀ friction is considered in our extended
NOEM model, the relevant prices for equilibrium trade flows as implied by the
invoicing conventions we analyze become the cif ones under CCP and the fob
ones under PCP. However, due to our symmetric iceberg costs assumption, we
have shown by the last equalities in (34) and (35) above that the fob values are
exactly equal to their respective cif values in both our CCP and PCP model
versions, so that trade shares can be meaningfully compared across alternative
price setting as if calculated on the same, cif basis. This latter, cif domestic-
currency value is, furthermore, the appropriate measure to use, since it duly
accounts for the diﬀerence between quantities bought and quantities consumed
arising from the output lost in transit and thus reflects the true cost to the
representative consumer.
Substitutions for optimal domestic and external demands for H and F out-
put and use of the ideal CPI definitions derive — under full symmetry and sep-
arable preferences — the CCP vs. PCP equilibrium trade shares in the main
text.
The derivation under CCP for Home is:
(ft)CH,s ≡
(FT )CH,s
Y CH,s
=
(Ex )C,cifH,s +(Im )
C,cif
H,s
(DA)CH,s+(Ex )
C,cif
H,s
=
SCs ·
FC cifz }| {
P ∗,CH ·
c o n sum edz}|{
c∗,CH,s +
H C cifz}|{
PCF ·
c o n sum edz}|{
cCF,s
PCH ·cCH,s+SCs ·P
∗,C
H| {z }
FC cif
· c∗,CH,s|{z}
c o n s um ed
=
=
SCsz}|{
Ms
M∗s
P ∗,CH
c∗,CH,sz }| {
1
2
Ã
P ∗,CH
P ∗,C
!−ν
M∗s
P ∗,C
+ PCF
cCF,sz }| {
1
2
µ
PCF
PC
¶−ν
Ms
PC
PCH
1
2
µ
PCH
PC
¶−ν
Ms
PC| {z }
cCH,s
+
Ms
M∗s|{z}
SCs
P ∗,CH
1
2
Ã
P ∗,CH
P ∗,C
!−ν
M∗s
P ∗,C| {z }
c∗,CH,s
=
Using our earlier result that, under CCP, Home and Foreign price levels are
equal, due to the symmetry in the model, i.e. PC = P ∗,C , and dividing through
by Ms
(PC)1−ν , we obtain:
=
P ∗,CH
³
P ∗,CH
´−ν
+ PCF
¡
PCF
¢−ν
PCH
¡
PCH
¢−ν
+ P ∗,CH
³
P ∗,CH
´−ν = (P ∗,CH )1−ν + (PCF )1−ν
(PCH )
1−ν + (P ∗,CH )
1−ν
=
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Recalling that P ∗,CH = P
C
F , due to the symmetry again, one can write:
=
(P ∗,CH )
1−ν + (P ∗,CH )
1−ν
(PCH )
1−ν + (P ∗,CH )
1−ν
=
2(P ∗,CH )
1−ν
(PCH )
1−ν + (P ∗,CH )
1−ν
=
Now dividing through by (P ∗,CH )
1−ν , we finally get:
=
2(P ∗,CH )
1−ν
(P ∗,CH )
1−ν
(PCH )
1−ν
(P ∗,CH )
1−ν
+
(P ∗,CH )
1−ν
(P ∗,CH )
1−ν
=
2Ã
PCH
P ∗,CH
!1−ν
+ 1
So under CCP
(ft)CH =
2³
PCH
P∗,CH
´1−ν
+ 1
=
2³
E0[ul,sMs]
1
1−τE0[ul,sM∗s ]
´1−ν
+ 1
=
=
2
(1− τ)1−ν + 1
= const Q 1 for ν R 1,
which is (29) in the main text.
The derivation under PCP for Home is:
(ft)PH,s ≡
(FT )PH,s
Y PH,s
=
≡(Ex )P,cifH,sz }| {
(Ex )P,fobH,s +
≡(Im )P,cifH,sz }| {
(Im)P,fobH,s
(DA)PH,s+(Ex )
P,fob
H,s| {z }
≡(Ex )P,cifH,s
=
HC fobz}|{
PPH
p ro d u c edz}|{
c∗,PH,s
1−τ +S
P
s
FC fobz }| {
P ∗,PF
p ro d u c e dz}|{
cPF,s
1−τ
PPH c
P
H,s+ P
P
H|{z}
HC fob
c∗,PH,s
1−τ|{z}
p ro d u c ed
=
=
PPH
1− τ
≡c∗,PH,sz }| {
1
2


PPH
SPs (1− τ)
P ∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
+
SPs P
∗
F
1− τ
≡cPF,sz }| {
1
2


SPs P
∗,P
F
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
PPH
1
2
µ
PPH
PPs
¶−ν
Ms
PPs| {z }
≡cPH
+
PPH
1− τ
1
2


PPH
SPs (1− τ)
P ∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps| {z }
≡c∗,PH,s
=
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=1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ν


1
1− τ


1
SPs (1− τ)
P ∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
+
SPs
1− τ


SPs
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Ms
PPs


1
2
¡
PPH
¢1−ν


µ
1
PPs
¶−ν Ms
PPs
+
1
1− τ


1
SPs (1− τ)
P ∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps


=
=
1
1− τ


1
SPs (1− τ)
P ∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
+
SPs
1− τ


SPs
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
µ
1
PPs
¶−ν Ms
PPs
+
1
1− τ


1
SPs (1− τ)
P ∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
=
=
1 +
SPs
1− τ


SPs
1− τ
PPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
Ã
1
1− τ
!1−ν


1
SPs
P ∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
Ã
1
PPs
!−νMs
PPs
Ã
1
1− τ
!1−ν


1
SPs
P ∗,Ps


−ν
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
+ 1
=
1 + SPs
(1− τ)ν−1
µ
SPs
PPs
¶−ν
(1− τ)ν−1


1
SPs
P ∗,Ps


−ν
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps
M∗s
µ
1
PPs
¶−ν
(1− τ)ν−1


1
SPs
P ∗,Ps


−ν
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps
M∗s
+ 1
=
=
1 + SPs


SPs
PPs
P ∗,Ps
1
SPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps
M∗s
(1− τ)ν−1


1
PPs
P ∗,Ps
1
SPs


−ν
Ms
PPs
P ∗,Ps
M∗s
+ 1
=
1 + SPs
·¡
SPs
¢2 P ∗,Ps
PPs
¸−ν
Ms
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
PPs
1
(1− τ)ν−1
·
SPs
P ∗,Ps
PPs
¸−ν
Ms
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
PPs
+ 1
=
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=1 +
SPs
1− τ
·¡
SPs
¢2 P ∗,Ps
PPs
¸−ν
Ms
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
PPsµ
1
1− τ
¶ν−1 ·
SPs
P ∗,Ps
PPs
¸−ν
Ms
M∗s
P ∗,Ps
PPs
+ 1
=
1 +
¡
SPs
¢1−2ν Ms
M∗s
µ
P ∗,Ps
PPs
¶1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
−ν Ms
M∗s
µ
P ∗,Ps
PPs
¶1−ν
+ 1
.
Now recall our earlier result (33) that
SPs =
µ
M∗s
Ms
¶ 1
1−2ν
µ
PPs
P ∗,Ps
¶ 1−ν
1−2ν
.
Rearranging, we can write it as:
¡
SPs
¢1−2ν
=
M∗s
Ms
µ
PPs
P ∗,Ps
¶1−ν
.
Hence:
Ms
M∗s
µ
P ∗,Ps
PPs
¶1−ν
=
1
(SPs )
1−2ν ,
which we now use to substitute MsM∗s
³
P∗,Ps
PPs
´1−ν
out in our PCP Home trade
share derivation, as we continue it below:
(ft)PH,s =
1 +
¡
SPs
¢1−2ν Ms
M∗s
µ
P ∗,Ps
PPs
¶1−ν
(1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
−ν Ms
M∗s
µ
P ∗,Ps
PPs
¶1−ν
+ 1
=
=
1 +
¡
SPs
¢1−2ν 1
(SPs )
1−2ν
(1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
−ν 1
(SPs )
1−2ν + 1
=
=
1 + 1
(1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
−ν−1+2ν
+ 1
=
=
2
(1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
ν−1
+ 1
We can finally write:
(ft)PH,s =
2
(1− τ)1−ν (SPs )
ν−1
+ 1
=
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=
2
(1− τ)1−ν
½³
M∗s
Ms
´ 1
1−2ν
³
PPs
P∗,Ps
´ 1−ν
1−2ν
¾
| {z }
=SPs
ν−1
+ 1
6= const unless SPs = 1,
which is (30) in the main text.
The respective expressions for Foreign can be derived by analogy to be:
(ft)CF,s =
2Ã
P∗,CF
PCH
!1−ν
+1
= 2Ã
E0[u∗lM
∗
s ]
1
1−τE0[u∗lM∗s ]
!1−ν
+1
=
= 2
(1−τ)1−ν+1 = const Q 1 for ν R 1 vs.
(ft)PF,s =
2
(1−τ)1−ν
·³
M∗s
Ms
´ 1
1−2ν
³
PPs
P∗,Ps
´ 1−ν
1−2ν
¸
| {z }
=SPs
1−ν
+1
6= const unless SPs = 1,
which correspond to (31) and (32) in the main text.
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B Proofs of Propositions
B.1 Proposition 1 (Relative Consumption)
Proof.
• Under CCP and full symmetry with separable preferences and iceberg
costs (recall that in this case PCH = P
∗,C
F and P
∗,C
H = P
C
F and thus P
C =
P ∗,C), relative real consumption can be expressed as follows:
cCs
c∗,Cs
≡
cCH,s + c
C
F,s
c∗,CF,s + c
∗,C
H,s
=
1
2
³
PCH
PC
´−ν
Ms
PC +
1
2
³
PCF
PC
´−ν
Ms
PC
1
2
³
P∗,CF
P∗,C
´−ν M∗s
P∗,C +
1
2
³
P∗,CH
P∗,C
´−ν M∗s
P∗,C
=
=
1
2
¡
1
PC
¢−ν Ms
PC
h¡
PCH
¢−ν
+
¡
PCF
¢−νi
1
2
¡
1
P∗,C
¢−ν M∗s
P∗,C
·³
P ∗,CF
´−ν
+
³
P ∗,CH
´−ν¸ = MsM∗s = SCs 6= 1 unless Ms =M∗s ;
• Under PCP and full symmetry with separable preferences and iceberg
costs (so that PPH = P
∗,P
F , P
P
F,s =
SPs P
∗,P
F
1−τ , P
∗,P
H,s =
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
and thus
PPs =

 1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−ν


1
1−ν
P ∗,Ps ), analogous reasoning derives relative
real consumption to be:
cPs
c∗,Ps
≡
cPH,s + c
P
F,s
c∗,PF,s + c
∗,P
H,s
=
1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ν
Ms
PPs
+ 12
µ
PPF,s
PPs
¶−ν
Ms
PPs
1
2
³
P∗,PF
P∗,Ps
´−ν M∗s
P∗,Ps
+ 12
µ
P∗,PH,s
P∗,Ps
¶−ν
M∗s
P∗,Ps
=
=
1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ν
Ms
PPs
+ 12
Ã
SPs P
∗,P
F
1−τ
PPs
!−ν
Ms
PPs
1
2


P∗,PF
PPs


1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
Ã
1
1−τ
1
SPs
!1−ν


1
1−ν


−ν
M∗s
PPs


1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
Ã
1
1−τ
1
SPs
!1−ν


1
1−ν
+ 12


PPH
SPs (1−τ)
PPs


1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
Ã
1
1−τ
1
SPs
!1−ν


1
1−ν


−ν
M∗s
PPs


1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
Ã
1
1−τ
1
SPs
!1−ν


1
1−ν
=
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=1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ν
Ms
PPs

1 +
Ã
SPs
1−τ
1
!−ν

1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ν M∗s
PPs



 1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−ν


1
1−ν


1−ν
+
³
1
SPs (1−τ)
´−ν

 1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−ν


1
1−ν


1−ν =
=
Ms
M∗s
·
1 +
³
SPs
1−τ
´−ν¸
1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−ν + ³ 1SPs (1−τ)´−ν 1+( 11−τ SPs )1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−ν
=
=
Ms
M∗s
·
1 +
³
SPs
1−τ
´−ν¸
1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−ν
·
1 +
³
1
SPs (1−τ)
´−ν¸ 6= 1 unless Ms =M∗s ⇒ SPs = 1.
We finally derive the above formula for two special cases widely exploited in
the NOEM literature, namely τ = 0 and ν = 1.
For τ = 0:
cPs
c∗,Ps
=
Ms
M∗s
·
1 +
³
SPs
1−0
´−ν¸
1+( 11−0SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−0
1
SPs
¶1−ν
·
1 +
³
1
SPs (1−0)
´−ν¸ =
=
Ms
M∗s
h
1 +
¡
SPs
¢−νi
1+(SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
SPs
¶1−ν
·
1 +
³
1
SPs
´−ν¸ =
=
Ms
M∗s
h
1 +
¡
SPs
¢−νi h
1 +
¡
SPs
¢ν−1ih
1 + (SPs )
1−ν
i £
1 + (SPs )
ν¤ =
=
Ms
M∗s
1 +
¡
SPs
¢ν−1
+
¡
SPs
¢−ν
+ SPs
1 + (SPs )
ν
+ (SPs )
1−ν
+ SPs
=
=
Ms
M∗s
1 + SPs +
³
1
SPs
´ν
+
³
1
SPs
´1−ν
1 + SPs + (SPs )
ν
+ (SPs )
1−ν 6= 1 unless Ms =M∗s ⇒ SPs = 1 with 0 < ν <<∞⇒
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⇒ c
P
s
c∗,Ps
= 1 with ν →∞ when τ = 0.
For ν = 1:
cPs
c∗,Ps
=
Ms
M∗s
·
1 +
³
SPs
1−τ
´−1¸
1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−1
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−1
·
1 +
³
1
SPs (1−τ)
´−1¸ =
=
Ms
M∗s
1 + 1−τSPs
1+1
1+1 [1 + S
P
s (1− τ)]
=
=
Ms
M∗s
1 + 1−τSPs
1 + SPs (1− τ)
6= 1 unless Ms =M∗s ⇒ SPs = 1 with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1.
This completes our proof.
B.2 Proposition 2 (Home Bias)
Proof.
• Under CCP and full symmetry with separable preferences and iceberg
costs (PCH = P
∗,C
F and P
∗,C
H = P
C
F and thus P
C = P ∗,C), the optimal
split-up of real consumption between demand for domestic and foreign
goods can be expressed as follows.
For Home:
cCH,s
cCF,s
=
1
2
³
PCH
PC
´−ν
Ms
PC
1
2
³
PCF
PC
´−ν
Ms
PC
=
³
ϕ
ϕ−1P
C E0[ul,sMs]
E0[uc,sMs]
´−ν
µ
1
1−τ
ϕ
ϕ−1P
,C E0[u
∗
l,sMs]
E0[u∗c,sM∗s ]
¶−ν =
=
1³
1
1−τ
´−ν = (1− τ)−ν > 1, for ∀s ∈ S when 0 < τ < 1 and ν > 0⇒
⇒
cPH,s
cPF,s
= 1 if (1) τ = 0, for ∀s ∈ S, or (2) ν = 0, for ∀s ∈ S.
For Foreign:
c∗,CF,s
c∗,CH,s
=
1
2
³
P∗,CF
P∗,C
´−ν M∗s
P∗,C
1
2
³
P∗,CH
P∗,C
´−ν M∗s
P∗,C
=
µ
ϕ
ϕ−1P
∗,C E0[u
∗
l,sM
∗
s ]
E0[u∗c,sM∗s ]
¶−ν
³
1
1−τ
ϕ
ϕ−1P
∗,C E0[ul,sM∗s ]
E0[uc,sMs]
´−ν =
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=
1³
1
1−τ
´−ν = (1− τ)−ν > 1, for ∀s ∈ S when 0 < τ < 1 and ν > 0⇒
⇒
cPH,s
cPF,s
= 1 if (1) τ = 0, for ∀s ∈ S, or (2) ν = 0, for ∀s ∈ S.
• Under PCP and full symmetry with separable preferences and iceberg
costs (PPH = P
∗,P
F , P
P
F,s = S
P
s
P∗,PF
1−τ , P
∗,P
H,s =
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
and thus PPs =

 1+( 11−τ SPs )
1−ν
1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
¶1−ν


1
1−ν
P ∗,Ps ), analogous reasoning derives the optimal split-
up of real consumption, as follows.
For Home:
cPH,s
cPF,s
=
1
2
³
PPH
PPs
´−ν
Ms
PPs
1
2
Ã
SPs P
∗,P
F
1−τ
PPs
!−ν
Ms
PPs
=
1³
SPs
1−τ
´−ν = µ1− τSPs
¶−ν
=
(1− τ)−ν
(SPs )
−ν =
=
¡
SPs
¢ν ≡CCP home biasz }| {
(1− τ)−ν| {z }
≡PCP optimal split-up in Home
Q 1 for SPs Q 1− τ when 0 < τ < 1 and ν > 0⇒
⇒
cPH,s
cPF,s
= 1 if (1) SPsτ = 1− τ , for ∀sτ ⊂ S or (2) ν = 0, for ∀s ∈ S.
For Foreign:
c∗,CF,s
c∗,CH,s
=
1
2
³
P∗,PF
P∗,Ps
´−ν M∗s
P∗,Ps
1
2
" PPH
SPs (1−τ)
P∗,Ps
#−ν
M∗s
P∗,Ps
=
1h
1
SPs (1−τ)
i−ν = £SPs (1− τ)¤−ν =
=
¡
SPs
¢−ν ≡CCP home biasz }| {
(1− τ)−ν| {z }
≡PCP optimal split-up in Foreign
Q 1 for 1
SPs
R 1−τ , when 0 < τ < 1 and ν > 0⇒
⇒
cPH,s
cPF,s
= 1 if (1) SPsτ = 1− τ , for ∀sτ ⊂ S or (2) ν = 0, for ∀s ∈ S.
This completes our proof.
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B.3 Proposition 3 (Relative Leisure)
Proof.
• Under CCP and full symmetry with separable preferences and iceberg
costs (PCH = P
∗,C
F , P
∗,C
H = P
C
F and P
C = P ∗,C), relative real output can
be expressed as:
yCs
y∗,Cs
≡
cCH,s + c
∗,C
H,s
c∗,CF,s + c
C
F,s
=
1
2
³
PCH
PC
´−ν
Ms
PC +
1
2
³
P∗,CH
P∗,C
´−ν M∗s
P∗,C
1
2
³
P∗,CF
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=
1
2
Ã
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[M∗s+(1−τ)νMs]
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6= 1 unless Ms =M∗s or τ = 0 or ν = 0⇔
⇔ yCs 6= y∗,Cs unless Ms =M∗s or τ = 0 or ν = 0.
Since y
C
s
y∗,Cs
≡ n
C
s
n∗,Cs
≡ 1−l
C
s
1−l∗,Cs
6= 1 (unless Ms =M∗s or τ = 0 or ν = 0):
lCs
l∗,Cs
6= 1⇔ lCs 6= l∗,Cs unless Ms =M∗s or τ = 0 or ν = 0.
• Under PCP and full symmetry with separable preferences and iceberg costs
(PPH = P
∗,P
F , P
P
F,s =
SPs P
∗,P
F
1−τ , P
∗,P
H,s =
PPH
SPs (1−τ)
and PPs =

 1+( 11−τ SPs )
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1+
µ
1
1−τ
1
SPs
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

1
1−ν
P ∗,Ps ),
analogous reasoning derives relative real output to be:
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=Ms +
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Since y
P
s
y∗,Ps
≡ n
P
s
n∗,Ps
≡ 1−l
P
s
1−l∗,Ps
6= 1 unless Ms =M∗s ⇒ SPs = 1, then:
lPs
l∗,Ps
6= 1⇔ lPs 6= l∗,Ps unless Ms =M∗s ⇒ SPs = 1.
This completes our proof.
B.4 Proposition (Expected Trade Shares under PCP)
Proof. 38 Recall the formulas for the equilibrium trade shares we derived
for Home, (30), and Foreign, (32), under PCP (skipping the P supersript for
convenience since now, in the PCP case, there is no ambiguity on invoicing):
ftH (Ss) =
2
(1− τ)1−ν Sν−1s + 1
and ftF (Ss) =
2
(1− τ)1−ν S1−νs + 1
.
With full symmetry, as assumed:
ftH (Ss) = ftF (1/Ss) .
Let us first focus on Home’s trade share.
Symmetry in our particular context here implies that for each state of nature
s there is a symmetric state s0 such that:
1. the exchange rate is inverse: Ss0 = 1/Ss;
2. the two states have the same probability: πs = πs0 .
Then expected trade share across the two symmetric states in the pair is:
E0
£
ftH,(s,s0) (Ss)
¤
= πsftH (Ss) + πsftH (Ss0) =
= πs
2
(1− τ)1−ν Sν−1s + 1
+ πs
2
(1− τ)1−ν S1−νs + 1
=
= πs
2
(1− τ)1−ν + 1
"
(1− τ)1−ν + 1
(1− τ)1−ν Sν−1s + 1
+
(1− τ)1−ν + 1
(1− τ)1−ν S1−νs + 1
#
=
= πsftH,pegF (Ss) .
38 I am indebted to Cédric Tille for suggesting to me this straightforward proof.
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The expectation is thus equal to the constant trade share under peg (or CCP),
ftH,peg = 2(1−τ)1−ν+1 , times the function F (Ss) =
(1−τ)1−ν+1
(1−τ)1−νSν−1s +1
+ (1−τ)
1−ν+1
(1−τ)1−νS1−νs +1
.
For a benchmark, consider what would be the value of the above expectation
if the trade share was a constant, i.e. ftH (Ss) = ftH (Ss0) = ftH,peg. Then
one would have:
E0
£
ftH,(s,s0) (Ss)
¤
= 2πsftH,peg
We shall now show that F (Ss) ≥ 2, which would mean that the expected trade
share for each pair of symmetric states exceeds the corresponding trade share
under peg.
One can easily prove that:
F (Ss) = F (1/Ss) and F (1) = 2,
i.e. that F (Ss) is a symmetric function equal to 2 when the exchange rate is 1.
We further write:
F 0 (Ss) = (ν − 1) (1− τ)1−ν
h
(1− τ)1−ν + 1
i
×
×

− S
ν−2
sh
(1− τ)1−ν Sν−1s + 1
i2 + S−νsh
(1− τ)1−ν S1−νs + 1
i2

 ,
F 0 (1) = 0,
so that F (Ss) is flat at S = 1. Moreover:
F 00 (Ss) = (ν − 1) (1− τ)1−ν
h
(1− τ)1−ν + 1
i
×
×


− (ν − 2) S
ν−3
s
[(1−τ)1−νSν−1s +1]
2 + 2 (ν − 1) S
ν−2
s (1−τ)
1−νSν−2s
[(1−τ)1−νSν−1s +1]
3
−ν S
−ν−1
s
[(1−τ)1−νS1−νs +1]
2 + 2 (ν − 1) (1−τ)
1−νS−νs S
−ν
s
[(1−τ)1−νS1−νs +1]
3

 ,
F 00 (1) =
2 (ν − 1)2 (1− τ)2(1−ν)h
(1− τ)1−ν + 1
i2 h1− (1− τ)ν−1i .
We now have to consider two cases, in addition to the trivial third case of
unit substitutability when the trade share is constant at 1.
• Elastic import demand, ν > 1. In this case F (Ss) is convex around S = 1,
which proves that the function F (Ss) attains a local minimum F (1) = 2
around S = 1. Then it follows that F (Ss) ≥ 2, at least around S = 1
(the region in which we are interested in, particularly under price rigidity
compatible with relatively small money shocks as assumed in this paper).
Finally, summing over all pairs of symmetric states, we obtain:
E0 [ftH (Ss)] ≥ ftH,peg ⇔ F (Ss) ≥ 2.
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The same arguments apply for Foreign’s expected trade share. Adding up
the expected trade share for the two countries in the model leads to the
conclusion that expected trade in terms of output is (slightly) lower under
peg than under float, trade costs and import demand elasticity.
• Inelastic import demand, 0 < ν < 1. In this case F (Ss) is concave around
S = 1, which proves that the function F (Ss) attains a local maximum
F (1) = 2 around S = 1. Then it follows that F (Ss) ≤ 2, at least around
S = 1 (the region in which we are interested in, particularly under price
rigidity compatible with relatively small money shocks as assumed in this
paper). Finally, summing over all pairs of symmetric states, we obtain:
E0 [ftH (Ss)] ≤ ftH,peg ⇔ F (Ss) ≤ 2.
The same arguments apply for Foreign’s expected trade share. Adding
up the expected trade share for the two countries in the model leads to
the conclusion that expected trade in terms of output is (slightly) higher
under peg than under float, trade costs and import demand inelasticity.
This completes our proof.
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